




The Fabric of Economics and
National Security Law
In his first term President George Bush's most enduring achievements have
relied upon the flexing of U.S. economic and national security power. The
lightning-quick Persian Gulf War witnessed not only the use of American and
allied military force, but also the sustained application of comprehensive, uni-
lateral and multilateral economic sanctions. On a front closer to home, the Bush
administration commenced negotiations that drew the nation closer to a
hemisphere-wide free trade area that would include both Canada and Mexico.
Both efforts required the United States to marshal dramatically its economic and
national security powers, raising significant questions about the proper role of the
three governmental branches in the legal regimes governing those powers.
This article examines the major areas in which the three branches have de-
veloped economics and national security law during the history of our republic.
Such legal regimes generally fall into two broad categories: first, those laws that
manipulate fiscal, monetary, and domestic economic policies to achieve national
security goals; and second, those laws that control or respond to external rela-
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tions through economic measures. The legal regimes governing each category
show how the complex interaction among all three branches influences U.S.
economics and national security policy. As important, they demonstrate how our
constitutional system of government creates the legal means that both authorize
and limit our political system's attempts to achieve its economics and national
security goals.
Upon reflection, U.S. national security policy incorporates at least five iden-
tifiable economic elements. First, U.S. national security depends heavily upon a
healthy domestic economy that is fully capable of supporting U.S. military and
political goals. Second, national security policy regularly requires the use of
economic power as a tool, either as a stick to sanction hostile nations or as a carrot
to encourage the economic growth and development of friendly ones. Third, U.S.
national security militates in favor of preventing hostile nations from obtaining
crucial military technologies and materials. Fourth, the domestic economy's abil-
ity to satisfy defense needs hinges upon maintaining ample domestic stocks of
critical materials. Fifth, national security may require that U.S. economic controls
apply with sufficient force not just to adversaries, but also to allies, so as to ensure
implementation of a unified and coordinated national policy.
Over the decades Congress, the President, and the courts have developed and
elaborated five major statutory schemes to regulate economic and national se-
curity power. These schemes, which address a spectrum of problems ranging
from domestic economic regulation, to emergency powers, to export controls, to
trade and import controls, to extraterritorial application of U.S. law, have given
the federal government broad powers to manage economic and national security
affairs. Although the Constitution assigns Congress the task of regulating foreign
and domestic commerce, more often than not the executive branch has won the
dominant hand in setting policy in these areas. Hence, this article examines the
parallel growth of governmental economic and national security power and of
presidential power within the constitutional system.
Part I traces the historical development of American economics and national
security decision making to show how our governmental institutions have dis-
tributed constitutional powers among themselves. Part II scrutinizes in closer
detail the post-World War II relationship between economics and U.S. national
security, and examines how the constitutional system has developed the decision-
making mechanisms that have set the modern foundations of policy in those
areas. Part III discusses how two parallel trends, the rising importance of eco-
nomic factors for U.S. national security and the growing presidential power over
both, have affected the five major categories of economics and national security
laws outlined above.
In reviewing this terrain, our goal is not to be exhaustive. Instead, the article
has a thematic purpose: to demonstrate the close linkage between the central-
ization of economics and national security power and the growth in presidential
power. The Cold War threat pushed power into the hands of the executive,
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which, as a matter of constitutional structure, was the branch best able to use it.
However, in areas that have closely engaged the interests of constituency groups
or have not required regular executive action, Congress and the courts have
succeeded in enforcing a more balanced institutional approach to economics and
national security decision making.
Hence, the five statutory schemes examined in the article occupy a broad
spectrum of congressional-executive cooperation. At one end, representing an
extreme of virtually unchecked executive discretion, sits the realm of emergency
international economic powers. Further along the spectrum, an examination of
export controls, defense production, trade, and fiscal controls reveals a striking
increase in the degree of balanced participation among the decision-making
branches. The article argues that changing institutional and international factors
recommend that economics and national security power in the future operate
closer to the latter, "power-sharing" model-what one of the authors has called
the central theme of the United States' "National Security Constitution" '-than
to the former paradigm of relatively unchecked executive discretion. More ex-
plicit acceptance of power-sharing as a constitutional norm would not only
enhance the democratic nature of foreign policymaking, but would also recog-
nize the indispensable checking function that other branches and international
allies play vis-A-vis the exercise of U.S. economic and national security power.
No single branch of government can mandate this reform. Instead, it must come
about through a combination of presidential restraint, congressional reassertion
of power, and judicial intervention into the balance of powers among the
branches.
I. The Growth of Presidential Power in
International Economic Affairs
During the last two centuries the growing interrelationship between U.S.
economics and national security has steadily paralleled the rising power of the
presidency within our constitutional system of government. This part of the
article traces these historical developments by examining the various schemes
that developed under the Jefferson, Lincoln, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt
(FDR) administrations. First, we briefly outline the constitutional allocation of
powers over the economy and national security. Then follows an examination of
the use of the embargo in the early Republic to enforce Jeffersonian national
security goals, the striking growth of emergency powers under President Lin-
coln, and finally, FDR's use of domestic economic regulation for national secu-
rity purposes. The persistent theme is that events have forced these presidents to
centralize power in both the federal government and in the office of the presi-
1. See generally HAROLD HONGJu KOH, THE NATIONAL SECuRITY CONSTrrTUION: SHARING
Powa AFrER THE IRAN-CoNTRA AFFAIR (1990).
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dency. Moreover, these historical examples also show the precursors to the
modem system of export, emergency, and domestic economic powers that form
the core of today's economic and national security policies, described further in
Part III.
A. ECONOMICS AND NATIONAL SECURITY
IN THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUION
When the delegates to the Constitutional Convention met during the summer
of 1787, concerns about national security and the economy were forefront in
their minds. Opening the "main business" of the Convention on May 29, the
first speaker, Edmund Randolph, rose to cite the defects of the Articles of
Confederation. "The confederation produced no security against foreign inva-
sion," Randolph argued, nor could Congress "prevent a war nor support it by
their own authority."
2
Randolph noted that a stronger central government would permit the central
government both to wage economic warfare, the "counteraction of the commer-
cial regulations of other countries," and to push its own exports overseas. 3 Other
delegates agreed. According to Roger Sherman of Connecticut, any national
government must have the authority to pursue four primary goals, three of which
involved national security and the economy: "defense against foreign danger";
defense "against internal disputes and a resort to force"; "treaties with foreign
nations"; and "regulating foreign commerce and drawing revenue from it."
4
To achieve these goals, the Framers expressly afforded the national govern-
ment more power at the expense of the states. At the federal level they created
an executive branch designed to act swiftly to guard the nation's safety, and to
operate consistently with the core principle of separation of powers. Thus, while
expanding the foreign affairs power of the federal government, the new Consti-
tution subjected that power to the institutional checks and balances that also
governed domestic affairs. Moreover, this design initially placed Congress in the
leading role in foreign affairs, but also left room for the executive to take the
initiative.
Accordingly, the Constitution gave Congress many, if not most, of the enu-
merated powers over national security and the economy. Article I, section 8
placed with Congress important national security powers to "declare War, grant
Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land
and Water"; to "provide for the common Defense"; to "regulate Commerce
with foreign nations"; to "define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on
the high seas" and offenses against the "Law of Nations"; to "raise and support
2. NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 29
(Adrienne Koch ed., 1966).
3. Id. at 29.
4. Id. at 74.
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Armies," to "provide and maintain a Navy," and to set rules regulating them
plus the power to "establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization."
5
Article I also made Congress paramount in economic affairs. Congress re-
ceived the power to regulate both interstate and foreign commerce; to "lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises"; to "borrow Money on the credit of
the United States"; as well as the power to "coin Money, regulate the Value
thereof, and of foreign Coin." Article I further authorized Congress to grant
patents and copyrights; to set uniform bankruptcy laws, and to "pay the Debts
and provide for the .... general Welfare of the United States." 6 Beyond these
specific grants, the Framers also granted Congress the broad, undefined power
"to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Exe-
cution the foregoing Powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."
7
Article II, by contrast, granted the executive branch only a few specified, but
potentially expansive, powers. Article II named the President "Commander in
Chief" of the military, recognizing his authority to wage war once Congress had
declared it.8 Article H further empowered the President to "make Treaties" with
the advice and consent of the Senate, and to appoint and receive ambassadors. 9
Moreover, Article II vested all "executive power" in the President, coupled with
an obligation that he take care that the laws be "faithfully execute[d]. ' 1°
As a counterweight to the political branches, Article III established one Su-
preme Court and envisioned a system of inferior federal courts exercising juris-
diction over all cases arising under "this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties."'" Article III expressly extended federal jurisdiction to
"cases" affecting ambassadors and involving the admiralty and maritime laws,
and to "controversies" with foreign states, citizens and subjects.12 As imple-
mented by the Judiciary Act of 1789, these powers placed the judicial depart-
ment in a vital checking role over foreign affairs.'
3
Thus, the Constitution specified that powers relating to national security and
the economy were to remain shared powers. Congress would legislate, the Pres-
ident would execute, and the judiciary would interpret the laws, whether they
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
6. Id.
7. Id. cl. 8.
8. Id. art. 11, § 2.
9. Id.
10. Id. art. 11, § I.
11. Id. art. Ill, § 2.
12. Id.
13. 1 Stat. 73 (1789). The first Judiciary Act included, for example, the Alien Tort Statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1350, 1 Stat. 77 (1789), which gave federal district courts "original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations." See generally Harold
Hongju Koh, Civil Remedies for Uncivil Wrongs: Combatting Terrorism through Transnational
Public Law Litigation, 22 Ttx. INT'L L.J. 169 (1987); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public
Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2353 (1991).
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pertained to domestic or foreign affairs, and each branch would check the ex-
cesses of the others. 14 In time, however, power would soon flow to the execu-
tive, which the Founders saw as the branch most structurally suited for the
exercise of swift and unified power. 15
B. THE JEFFERSONIANS AND THE EMBARGO POWER
Economic and military competition among the European great powers threat-
ened the security of the early Republic. North America remained an important
source of trade for Europe and a battleground for European influence. Militarily
weak, the foundling nation sought to maintain its independence by adopting
economic measures. Almost from its inception the United States implemented
trade statutes that guarded its national security by restricting imports or exports
with offending great powers. As our national security increasingly required the
use of active economic measures, the president grew in power as the enunciator
and executor of U.S. policy. These dual developments culminated in the presi-
dency of Thomas Jefferson, who made extensive use of embargoes to preserve
U.S. national security.
International commerce proved at once to be the primary means for preserving
U.S. security. In the long run, the Jeffersonians believed the nation needed to
pursue free trade overseas, so as to provide markets for an agrarian, republican
society. 16 In the short term, U.S. leaders sought to use commerce as a means of
removing the United States from great-power conflicts. "The great rule of con-
duct for us in regard to foreign nations," George Washington said in his farewell
address, "is, in extending our commercial relations to have with them as little
political connection as possible." 17
In attempting to preserve U.S. national security and commerce, subsequent
presidents even risked open war. In response to French seizures of U.S. mer-
chantmen in 1796-97, President John Adams led the nation into its first "quasi-
war" with France to protect neutral shipping rights. But first he sought authority
from Congress, which in 1798 passed a series of statutes authorizing an unde-
clared war. Pursuant to these statutes treaties with France were broken, an
embargo went into effect, a navy was created with the power to seize French
ships, and a provisional army was raised. 18 These measures, some economic and
some military, were designed to safeguard U.S. shipping and to interrupt French
activities until France recognized the right of neutral shipping.
14. KOH, supra note 1, at 76.
15. See THE FDERAUST Nos. 64, 70, 74 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
16. See generally DREW R. McCoy, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN JEFFER-
SONIAN AMERICA (1980).
17. George Washington, Farewell Address, Sept. 17, 1796, reprinted in 2 MESSAGES AND PA-
PERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 213, 222 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897).
18. ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 144-45 (1976).
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Adams set the stage for Jefferson, under whose presidency the executive's
power to regulate the economy for national security purposes blossomed. How-
ever, Congress expressly authorized this expansion by steadily wider delegations
of authority, thus preserving the Constitution's vision of power-sharing. The
1803 war engulfing Europe transformed the United States into the world's largest
neutral carrier, leading to harassment of U.S. shipping by both the British and
French. British warships impressed U.S. sailors 19 and blockaded all ships bound
for the continent. Napoleon responded by seizing U.S. ships that had docked in
Britain.
In response, Jefferson requested and received from Congress the Embargo
Act, which prohibited all exports from the United States, and the Nonimporta-
tion Act, which forbade imports from Britain. Congress ceded Jefferson wide
discretion to wage economic war. Congress gave the President power to suspend
the embargo upon, in his judgment, "such changes in [Britain's and France's]
measures affecting neutral commerce, as may render that of the United States
sufficiently safe." 20 Congress also authorized Jefferson to apply or suspend the
nonimportation laws at his discretion, to employ the army and navy to enforce
the embargo laws, and to close U.S. harbors to foreign ships as he chose.2 1
Thus, the early Republic's leaders sought to guard U.S. security by delegating
to the executive the power to decide when and how to wage economic warfare.
One Federalist senator complained that President Jefferson had acquired "the
power, not of declaring war in form, but of adopting a course of measures which
will necessarily and inevitably lead to war.' 22 But Jefferson had not acted uni-
laterally; rather, Congress had overwhelmingly supported his policies and chose
to let him lead. This structure of presidential leadership and explicit congres-
sional approval characterized Jefferson's other foreign policy achievements, in-
cluding the Louisiana Purchase and pacifying the Barbary Pirates.23
This pattern similarly characterized events leading up to the War of 1812, the
logical culmination of Jefferson's policies. In the trade statutes leading up to the
war, the Non-intercourse Act and then Macon's Bill No. 2, Congress allowed
President Madison wide discretion to clamp down or lift the embargo against
Britain and France. Madison eventually used this delegated power to lift the
embargo against France and to continue it against Britain.
Indeed, President Madison and Congress decided to wage war against Britain
precisely because of the tight link between economic and national security is-
sues. In his June 1, 1812, war message to Congress, Madison said: "Our com-
merce had been plundered in every sea, the great staples of our country have been
19. For an historical account of one famous impressment case, see Ruth Wedgwood, The Rev-
olutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, 100 YALE L.J. 229 (1990).
20. 18 ANNALS OF CONG. 2065 (1808).
21. SoFAER, supra note 18, at 175-76; Act of Mar. 3, 1805, 2 Stat. 339, 341-42.
22. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 332, 335 (1808) (remarks of Sen. Hillhouse).
23. SOFAER, supra note 18, at 225-26.
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cut off from their legitimate markets, and a destructive blow aimed at our agricul-
tural and maritime interests" by Britain.24 Privately, Madison noted that the United
States had gone to war to protect its sovereignty "on which all nations whose
agriculture and commerce are so closely allied, have an essential interest."
25
Throughout the embargo policies of Adams, Jefferson, and Madison, the third
branch, the judiciary, maintained its balancing role in national security affairs. In
a series of cases the Supreme Court upheld congressional power to wage eco-
nomic warfare, but checked executive power to extend the scope of such wars.
In Bas v. Tingy the Supreme Court held that the United States could wage an
undeclared, "imperfect war" without a formal declaration because of explicit
congressional authorization. 26 Similarly, in The Cargo of the Brig Aurora v.
United States the Supreme Court upheld the congressional delegation of author-
ity to President Madison to suspend commerce with Britain while continuing it
with France. This act eventually forced war with Britain. 27 However, the Court
invalidated actions authorized by executive instruction, but outside the powers
delegated by Congress. In Little v. Barreme, the Court held liable a U.S. com-
mander who had seized a neutral ship in violation of a congressional statute, even
though he had acted pursuant to a presidential order.28 Again, in the 1814 case
Brown v. United States, Chief Justice Marshall held that the attorney general
could not seize British-owned timber once war had begun if Congress had passed
no law allowing such a measure.
29
Thus, early U.S. policy regarding economics and national security rested upon
a foundation of balanced institutional participation. Under President Jefferson and
his successors Congress gave the executive broad powers with which to wage
economic warfare. The courts acted as an umpire in upholding delegated power,
but also in preventing the executive from exceeding its statutory mandates.
Throughout, the presidency grew in power as it became the primary decision
maker in setting national security policy and waging economic warfare. The Jef-
fersonian period also demonstrates how export measures first assumed an im-
portant role in national security policy. Significantly, the precedent of broad con-
gressional delegations of authority to the executive would hold true over time and
would become the defining characteristic of our modem export control system.
C. LINCOLN AND THE RISE OF
EMERGENCY PRESIDENTIAL POWERS
National rebellion forced President Lincoln to adopt dramatic and unprece-
dented emergency measures to preserve the Union. Events had moved swiftly
24. LOYD C. GARDNER ET AL., CREATION OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE 92 (1976).
25. THOMAS G. PATERSON, AMERICAN FOREIGN PoLIcY: A HISToRY 70 (1988).
26. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 40-41 (1800).
27. The Cargo of the Brig Aurora, Burnside v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813).
28. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
29. Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
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even before Lincoln's inauguration. The Confederacy had established a govern-
ment, installed Jefferson Davis as President, assembled an army, and begun
seizing federal military facilities. Without convening Congress, Lincoln moved
with equal speed. He called up the militia, enlarged the military beyond con-
gressionally set limits, imposed a blockade on the South without a declaration of
war, and suspended the writ of federal habeas corpus.3 °
Previous Presidents had claimed an ambiguous emergency power, at which the
Framers had hinted, but scarcely described, in the Constitution's text. John
Locke, whose works heavily influenced the Framers, had argued that the exec-
utive sometimes had to act "according to discretion, for the public good, without
the prescription of law, and sometimes against it" during times of emergency.
31
In Federalist No. 23 Alexander Hamilton noted that the power of the federal
government to protect national security "ought to exist without limitation: be-
cause it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national
exigencies, or the corresponding extent and variety of the means which may be
necessary to satisfy them.
' 32
Before the Civil War, several Presidents had taken limited emergency actions.
Most notably, Thomas Jefferson had exercised, or laid claim to, emergency
power during the Louisiana Purchase, an 1806 British attack on a U.S. ship,
and the 1807 Burr Conspiracy. 33 However, in each instance Jefferson turned to
Congress for approval of any unilateral actions. Recognizing the need for pres-
idential emergency powers, Congress thereafter passed statutes during the wars
of 1812 and 1848 granting special powers, to be exercised at the President's
discretion, over economic warfare measures. These powers included prohibiting
shipping, blocking trade with the enemy, regulating imported goods, and con-
trolling foreign vessels in U.S. waters.
34
But no previous U.S. President had gone as far as Lincoln would go in using
unilateral emergency power. While some of Lincoln's actions invoked his con-
stitutional powers as commander-in-chief or his duty to execute the laws, 3
5
others clearly encroached upon Congress's textually enumerated powers to make
economic and national security decisions. Acting alone, Lincoln mobilized the
national economy and declared a blockade, decisions which arguably fell within
30. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session, July 4, 1861, in ABRAHAM
LINcoLN: SPEECHES AND WRrrios, 1859-1865, at 246, 252 (Don Fehrenbacher ed., 1989).
31. JOHN J. LOCKE, Two TREATSE OF GovERNMENT §§ 159-160, at 392-93 (P. Laslett ed.,
1970).
32. THE FIDERALIST No. 23, at 153 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
33. Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1392-93
(1989).
34. Harold Relyea, Reconsidering the National Emergencies Act: Its Evolution, Implementation,
and Deficiencies, in THE PREsIDENCY AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 274, 282 (R. Gordon Hoxie
ed., 1984).
35. Id. at 283-90. The latter clause, however, is a questionable source of presidential power.
"[B]y its own terms that phrase more clearly imposed upon the president a duty rather than a
license." KOH, supra note 1, at 76.
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Article I's interstate and foreign commerce clauses. Throughout the war Lincoln
ordered the seizure of property, the suppression of newspapers, the emancipation
of the slaves (which in addition to its human and political consequences, had
far-ranging economic impact), and planned reconstruction.
Lincoln conceded that he had acted outside his constitutional powers, but
defended himself by saying that the Constitution would mean little without the
nation: "I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful,
by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution through the
preservation of the nation," Lincoln later said.36
Although acting unilaterally, Lincoln went to Congress and the courts for sup-
port after the fact. In his July 4, 1861, message to Congress Lincoln defended his
emergency actions: "These measures, whether strictly legal or not, were ventured
upon, under what appeared to be popular demands and a public necessity; trusting,
then, as now, that Congress would readily ratify them. ' 37 Faced with this fait
accompli, Congress enacted the President's measures into law.
The judiciary followed Congress in deferring to the President. In the Prize
Cases, the Supreme Court upheld Lincoln's order imposing a blockade on the
South, even though Congress had never issued the declaration of war necessary
for a blockade.38 The blockade constituted an indispensable economic weapon
against the South, which relied on Europe as a market for its raw cotton and as
a source of manufactured goods. Moreover, the South hoped these economic ties
would bring England into the war on its side. 3 9 As in the early Republic, U.S.
national security depended on international commerce, but this time the execu-
tive wanted to strangle trade, not promote it.
In supporting the President's authority to suppress rebellion, the Court de-
ferred to the use of such expansive executive power. The Court found that the
President had an inherent, unenumerated power to quell rebellions, and that
Congress had ratified his decisions. Moreover, the Justices suggested that the
judiciary ought not review this exercise of national security and economic power,
even in an area textually granted to Congress. The Court then linked, for the first
time, the political question doctrine to economic and national security decisions
by the President. The President's means to subdue the insurrection, they said,
were "question[s] to be decided by him, and this Court must be governed by the
decisions and acts of the political department of the Government to which this
power was entrusted."4°
The Civil War gave rise to an enormous enlargement of the executive's power
to guide unilaterally economic and national security affairs. However, the Fram-
36. ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRINGs, supra note 30, at 283 (letter from Abraham
Lincoln to Albert G. Hodges (April 4, 1864)).
37. Id. at 252.
38. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
39. PATERSON, supra note 25, at 139-40.
40. Id. at 670 (emphasis added).
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ers' basic design of balanced institutional participation remained intact. Lincoln
did not claim unchecked executive power, but turned to Congress for approval of
his emergency actions. Although initially deferential, by 1866 the courts began
rejecting Lincoln's theory of emergency power. In Ex parte Milligan, a habeas
corpus case, the Court declared that the Constitution functioned "equally in war
and in peace. ' 4 1 The Court said: "No doctrine involving more pernicious
consequences was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of [the Con-
stitution's] provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of
government.' 
4 2
The Lincoln administration's use of emergency powers set an example for
later Presidents to follow. Put simply, external events forced political power to
flow to the branch best suited structurally for its exercise. Beset by the dire
events of the Civil War, Lincoln responded with a series of domestic emergency
economic measures. Although consulted afterwards, neither Congress nor the
courts challenged the President's action. While later Congresses would attempt
to regulate emergency powers, Presidents usually would find themselves unop-
posed even if they exceeded their statutory mandates. But this exercise of emer-
gency power, still formally domestic, had not yet been directed outward toward
foreign governments or entities.
D. FDR, ECONOMIC REGULATION, AND NATIONAL SECURITY
If the Civil War years fueled a transient surge of presidential emergency
authority, the New Deal years marked a more fundamental revolution in presi-
dential power both at home and abroad. The Depression and World War II
combined to make FDR not just the United States' leader, but the world's. In the
realm of constitutional law, the executive branch claimed and received increas-
ingly broad authority to decide economic and national security issues. Often,
Congress and the Supreme Court helped give the President wide authority. How-
ever, FDR did not hesitate to act unilaterally when he believed that national
security was at stake. His actions triggered sweeping new federal regulation of
the domestic economy for national security ends.
FDR considered the Great Depression a powerful threat to the nation's secu-
rity. In his inaugural address, the new President compared the Depression to a
war against the United States that warranted extraordinary countermeasures:
It is hoped that the normal balance of Executive and legislative authority may be
wholly adequate to meet the unprecedented task before us. But it may be that an
unprecedented demand and need for undelayed action may call for temporary departure
from that normal balance of public procedure.
I am prepared under my constitutional duty to recommend the measures that a
stricken Nation in the midst of a stricken world may require. ...
41. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 2 (1866).
42. Id. at 120-21, 126.
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But in the event that the Congress shall fail to take one of these two courses, and in
the event that the national emergency is still critical, I shall not evade the clear course
of duty that will then confront me. I shall ask the Congress for the one remaining
instrument to meet the crisis-broad Executive power to wage a war against the
emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded
by a foreign foe.4 3
Only forty-eight hours after assuming office, the new President put his words
into action. On March 6, 1933, FDR issued the second emergency proclamation
in U.S. history, unilaterally imposing a national bank holiday and halting all
financial transactions. 44 Although he felt he could act unilaterally, FDR found
questionable statutory support for such far-reaching economic intervention in the
Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917. This act delegated broad economic powers
to the President to be used against enemy nationals during wartime or national
emergency.45 Congress soon approved FDR's constitutionally suspect action
with the passage of the Emergency Banking Act three days later.46 This cycle of
dubious presidential exercise of emergency power, followed by congressional
acquiescence or ratification, set a pattern that would repeat itself to the present
day.
FDR generally relied upon broad statutory delegations from Congress to guide
economic and national security affairs. In his first "hundred days," Congress
passed a torrent of legislation authorizing quick and almost limitless executive
action to combat the Depression. FDR also developed effective new ways of
exercising these powers by raising himself up in the public eye as a "plebiscitary
president" and by creating an expansive presidential bureaucracy capable of
acting more quickly and flexibly than the departments.
47
Initially, however, the Supreme Court challenged these authorizations of pres-
idential regulation of the economy. In two 1935 cases, the Court struck down
provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act as excessive delegations of
power to the executive. 48 But FDR's Court-packing threat, followed by changes
in Court personnel and FDR's landslide reelection in 1936, led the Supreme
Court to reverse itself and approve New Deal economic regulation. 49 By 1944,
the Supreme Court had reversed its nondelegation stand, allowing the President
to exercise sweeping powers handed over by Congress.
50
43. THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 15 (1938).
44. 48 Stat. 1689 (1933).
45. Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
46. Bank Conservation Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (1988).
47. See generally THEODORE Lowi, THE PERSONAL PRESIDENT 99 (1985) (defining "plebiscitary
president" as one in which the "lines of responsibility run direct to the White House, where the
president is personally responsible and accountable for the performance of government"); JERRY L.
MASHAW & RICHARD A. MERRILL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM: CASES
AND MATERIALS 156 (2d ed. 1985); KOH, supra note 1, at 96-97.
48. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
49. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
50. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
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While the Court resisted delegation of purely domestic economic power, it
proved more forgiving when the delegation also involved foreign affairs. The
intersection between economic and national security power lay at the heart of
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., a 1936 decision, which, as much as
any other, symbolizes a constitutional vision founded on broad inherent presi-
dential authority. 51 Curtiss-Wright attacked a joint resolution of Congress au-
thorizing the President to stop arms sales to Bolivia and Paraguay as an invalid
delegation of congressional power. Justice Sutherland, writing for the Court,
upheld the President's action against the nondelegation attack: "[I]f, in the
maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment. . . is to be avoided,"
he wrote, "congressional legislation which is to be made effective through
negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord to the
President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which
would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved." 52 This language,
which can be called the "Curtiss-Wright theory of statutory construction," has
subsequently fostered unusual judicial deference when courts construe statutes
that delegate powers to the President in foreign affairs.
The broader intellectual legacy of Curtiss-Wright, however, has been its ex-
pansive constitutional theory of inherent presidential powers over foreign affairs.
Examining the history of U.S. foreign relations, Justice Sutherland postulated an
extra-constitutional theory of sovereignty: "Investment of the federal govern-
ment with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative
grants of the Constitution." 53 Such powers, he said, "if they had never been
mentioned in the Constitution, would have been vested in the federal government
as necessary concomitants of nationality." 54 Because of the complexity of the
external world, Sutherland suggested that the executive branch had the unenu-
merated inherent power, even without congressional authorization, to order U.S.
foreign affairs:
In this vast external realm with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold
problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the
nation.
... [W]e are here dealing not alone with an authority vested in the President by an
exertion of legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary
and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the
field of international relations-apower which does not require as a basis for its
exercise an act of Congress ....
With these words, Justice Sutherland articulated a constitutional rationale for
the unchecked executive power FDR sought, but rested it upon shaky legal and
51. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
52. Id. at 320.
53. id. at 318.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 319-20 (citation omitted).
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historical grounds. As historians have noted, Sutherland's historical analysis was
deeply flawed. Meanwhile, legal scholars have emphasized that his constitutional
reasoning constituted unnecessary dicta and without explanation awarded federal
foreign affairs powers solely to the President, while repudiating the core con-
stitutional notion that presidential powers are not inherent, but derive solely from
the consent of the governed.5 6 However, by its own terms, Justice Sutherland's
opinion contained important, but often overlooked, words of limitation. By
emphasizing the President's power "to speak and listen," Sutherland arguably
defended only the long-recognized executive control over diplomatic communi-
cations, not a broader power to conclude international agreements or commit
troops. Furthermore, Curtiss-Wright expressly acknowledged that the Presi-
dent's power "must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of
the Constitution," including both substantive and procedural limitations set by
the Constitution, as well as the Bill of Rights.5 7 Nonetheless, Curtiss-Wright has
become the rhetorical touchstone for subsequent presidential claims of a plenary,
exclusive, foreign affairs power that exists independent of the Constitution and
of statutory authorization.5 s
A year later Justice Sutherland extended this inherent presidential power to
include certain international agreements, giving the executive a boost in ordering
the domestic economy for national security purposes. In United States v. Bel-
mont,59 the Court sanctioned the constitutionality of executive agreements,
which did not require approval of two-thirds of the Senate, when implemented
pursuant to recognition of a foreign government. Reacting to an executive agree-
ment known as the "Litvinov Assignment," FDR had extended diplomatic re-
lations to the Soviet Union in exchange for certain Soviet assets in the United
States. 60 Again writing for the Court, Justice Sutherland upheld the executive
agreement and the executive branch's seizure of the assets against a federalism
challenge. Five years later the Court reaffirmed its finding in United States v.
Pink, holding that the power to make such international agreements incident to
56. See generally David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice
Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467, 472-78 (1946); Charles A. Lofgren, United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1 (1973); KOH, supra note 1,
at 93-95.
57. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320. By substantive constitutional limits, we mean that Curtiss-
Wright did not give the President, as "sole organ," the power to declare war or regulate foreign
commerce, substantive powers that the Constitution expressly granted to Congress. By procedural
constitutional limits, we mean that Curtiss-Wright similarly did not authorize the President to make
treaties or appoint ambassadors without the constitutionally requisite senatorial consent. Nor did that
case authorize him, in the exercise of his foreign affairs authority, to override First Amendment or
Due Process rights.
58. See KOH, supra note 1, at 94 (among government attorneys, Justice Sutherland's lavish
description of the President's powers is so often quoted that it has come to be known as the
"Curtiss-Wright, so I'm right" cite-a statement of deference to the President so sweeping as to be
worthy of frequent citation in any government foreign-affairs brief).
59. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
60. Id. at 326-27.
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recognition of a foreign government was a "modest implied power of the Pres-
ident who is the 'sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations.' "61
Significantly, the central issue in both Belmont and Pink was the vertical
supremacy of such executive agreements over state law, not the horizontal su-
premacy of the President over Congress in the making of international agree-
ments. But in the years leading up to World War II, that distinction blurred as
FDR used both his judicially approved and congressionally delegated powers in
economic and national security areas. Supported by a legal opinion from then-
Attorney General Robert Jackson, 62 FDR employed a sole executive agreement
to seal the destroyer-for-bases deal that shored up Britain's naval defenses, and
ordered U.S. naval ships to convoy merchantmen bound for Great Britain, all
without congressional assent. Although Congress had tried to keep the United
States out of war by passing a series of neutrality acts from 1935-1937, FDR won
broad legislative authorization in the Lend-Lease Act to "sell, transfer title to,
exchange, lease lend, or otherwise dispose of" military equipment to "any
country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United
States.' 63
As war neared, FDR depended on his delegated powers to wage economic
warfare. After declaring a state of limited emergency when war broke out in
1939, Roosevelt issued a proclamation of unlimited national emergency by May
1941, thereby gaining access to an arsenal of delegated powers to conduct
economic warfare. 64 He sent troops via executive agreement to Iceland and
Greenland.65 Roosevelt initiated a series of economic warfare measures against
Japan, imposing embargoes on aviation fuel, scrap, and high-grade steel, freez-
ing all Japanese assets in the United States, and embargoing the sale of oil to the
Japanese war machine.
66
World War II thrust the United States into a position of global hegemony, with
its dominance in world affairs corresponding to a similar dominance by the
executive branch within the constitutional order. The Depression forced the
constitutional system to expand the federal government's economic authority.
Congress proceeded to delegate this authority largely to the President. This flow
of power spawned greater presidential use of economic measures not only to
61. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942) (quoting Curtiss-Wright).
62. 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 484 (1940).
63. Act of March 11, 1941, c.ll, 55 Stat. 31 (1941).
64. Pres. Procl. No. 2487, May 27, 1941, 6 Fed. Reg. 2617 (declaration of unlimited national
emergency); Pres. Procl. No. 2488, May 28, 1941, 6 Fed. Reg. 2461 (restriction of exports of
weapons and strategic materials).
65. Exec. Agrmt. 1941-29-22, July 1, 1941 (Iceland Defense).
66. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 8832, 3 C.F.R. 969 (1938-1943) (imposing restrictions on
Japanese foreign exchange transactions); Exec. Order No. 8889, 3 C.F.R. 1002 (1938-1943) (ex-
panding controls on petroleum and strategic materials exports); Exec. Order No. 8712, 3 C.F.R. 910
(1938-1943) (same).
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rescue the economy, but also to pursue a range of national security goals. Hence,
the New Deal years simultaneously centralized executive power over both eco-
nomic and national security affairs, offering the President the option of employ-
ing those powers as interchangeable or complementary policy instruments.
In sum, the administrations of Jefferson, Lincoln, and FDR forged and pro-
gressively strengthened the link between economics and national security. The
three Presidents increasingly relied upon economic measures, in lieu of and
supplemental to diplomatic and military measures, to safeguard the nation's
security. Jefferson employed trade embargoes to maintain U.S. independence
from the European great powers. Lincoln invoked emergency presidential pow-
ers to preserve the Union from the threat of rebellion. FDR implemented do-
mestic regulation, both to restore the health of the economy, and to pursue U.S.
national security policies.
These administrations laid three important foundations for current economic-
national security statutory regimes. First, modem Presidents now count trade
controls and embargoes, emergency economic powers, and domestic regulation
as their most effective economic weapons in implementing national security
policies. These three charismatic Presidents established patterns of presidential
initiative in national security policy, and through broad congressional delegations
of authority, implemented that policy through differing economic tools. Second,
acquiescing to presidential leadership, Congress wrote laws that imposed rela-
tively few conditions upon executive exercise of statutory powers. Third, the
courts regularly tolerated expansive congressional delegations and presidential
initiative, although they did not shy away from deciding such cases on the merits.
This emerging systemic pattern of executive initiative, congressional acquies-
cence, and judicial tolerance increasingly characterized all phases of our national
security policy. 67 This trend would crystallize during the postwar period into a
growing tug-of-war between the constitutional vision of balanced institutional
participation and the perceived need for unrestrained executive power.
II. The Cold War and the National Security State
The Cold War dramatically heightened U.S. concern for national security.
Threats of Communist aggression and international instability spurred demand
for centralized economic and national security controls. Policymakers sought to
implement economic measures they could bring to bear in a coordinated and
swift fashion upon national security crises. While the New Deal experience led
to a rapid consolidation of power in the executive branch, the Cold War provided
an ongoing external threat that accelerated the trend. Meanwhile, this ever-
present threat forced policymakers to develop, for the first time, comprehensive
statutory schemes for implementing economic and national security policy.
67. See generally KOH, supra note 1, at 5, 117-49.
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This part of the article examines the evolution of the current structure of
economics and national security policymaking, starting with the early Cold War
years, which saw the reaffirmation of balanced institutional participation as the
constitutional model for promulgating economic policy. Just as the early Cold
War laid the foundations for the national security state, so too it established the
modem relationship between economics and national security. The following
discussion traces how all three branches, spurred by the Cold War, structured a
system of presidential leadership in economic and national security decision
making that elevated economic goals into an integral component of national
security policy. At the same time, the Cold War fostered a rapid expansion in
presidential power, forcing the Supreme Court to intervene and reinforce the
constitutional vision of shared powers.
A. EcoNoMics, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND YOUNGSTOWN
World War II left U.S. leaders convinced of the interdependence between
economics and national security matters. Just as Munich had taught the value of
abandoning appeasement, so too the onset of war emphasized how economic
stability, brought about through national economic controls, could have main-
tained peace. First and foremost, U.S. leaders linked the worldwide depression
and ensuing economic instability of the 1930s to the rise of fascism. Thus,
shoring up the economies of Western Europe and Japan and establishing a stable
international economic system assumed top priority for the Truman adminis-
tration.
President Truman realized that alliance politics rendered U.S. national secu-
rity dependent upon the economic health of its allies. "Which is better for the
country," Truman asked during consideration of the Marshall Plan, "to spend
twenty or thirty billion dollars to keep the peace or to do as we did in 1920 and
then have to spend 100 billion dollars for four years to fight a war?" 6 8 Accord-
ingly, FDR and Truman committed themselves to jumpstarting Allied economies
with the Marshall Plan and laid the multilateral foundations of the postwar
economic order through the Bretton Woods Accords.
World War II also left policymakers convinced that national security required
close control over the domestic economy and its links to the international eco-
nomic system. Wartime mobilization had shown how management of the econ-
omy could sustain the military establishment necessary to fight a prolonged war
with the Soviets. At the same time, congressmen noted that U.S. steel, in the
form of Japanese bombs, had destroyed Pearl Harbor, thus revealing that exports
could both aid enemy governments and drain the United States of scarce military
resources.
68. JOHN L. GADDIS, STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT: A CRmcAL APPRAISAL OF POSTWAR AMER-
ICAN NATIONAL SECURITY PoLIcY 62 (1982) (quoting President Truman).
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These perceptions formed the intellectual underpinnings of the current U.S.
approach to economics and national security policy. In international relations, the
United States has sought to provide a stable economic order to promote healthy
economies for its allies. In domestic affairs, the federal government has extended
wartime controls over the economy and over exports. U.S. Presidents have
pursued these plans with the aim of buttressing the West in its efforts to contain
the Soviet threat. Not coincidentally, ensuring economic health abroad and ef-
fective economic regulation at home also effected new power shifts in favor of
the executive branch at the expense of Congress and the courts, severely strain-
ing our constitutional framework.
In 1950, North Korean troops suddenly poured across the border into South
Korea. President Truman, relying on his inherent powers as President and as
commander-in-chief, quickly ordered troops into combat and declared a national
emergency. In 1952, to prevent stoppage of steel production by a labor strike, he
ordered his secretary of commerce to seize the steel mills. 69 Invading a field of
domestic and foreign commerce constitutionally assigned to Congress, Truman
claimed "very great inherent powers" over the domestic economy for national
security purposes. "I feel sure," he said, "that the Constitution does not require
me to endanger our national safety by letting all the steel mills shut down." 70
Truman's constitutionally questionable use of executive power over the do-
mestic economy in support of national security ends prompted a judicial reaction
of enduring import. The Supreme Court rejected Truman's broad theory of
presidential power only eight weeks later in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer. A six-to-three majority struck down the seizure as an unconstitutional
usurpation of legislative authority.7 1 The famous concurring opinion of Justice
Jackson, whose earlier opinion as attorney general supporting the destroyer-for-
bases deal had helped spur the recent expansion of presidential foreign affairs
authority, reaffirmed the Constitution's underlying principle of balanced institu-
tional participation in both national security and economic policy. "Presidential
powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunc-
tion with those of Congress," he wrote, going on to outline a now-familiar
three-part framework:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Con-
gress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own
right plus all that Congress can delegate ....
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of
twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is uncertain....
69. Exec. Order No. 10,340, 3 C.F.R. 861 (1949-1953).
70. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 142 (1989) (quoting President
Truman).
71. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the express or implied will of
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.
72
Justice Jackson's opinion, since elevated by the Court into numerous majority
opinions, forcefully restored the balance among the branches in making national
security policy. 73 Jackson recognized that Presidents could exercise certain ple-
nary powers in both domestic and foreign affairs, such as the power to recognize
foreign governments. But outside of those narrow constitutional grants, the
President was obliged to recognize Congress's important role in setting national
objectives. In those areas the President could find safe constitutional ground only
when acting pursuant to congressional authorization. 74 Without legislative ap-
proval the President sailed into dangerous waters: If Congress had not specifi-
cally authorized the action, the question became whether the President had acted
in an area of concurrent executive-legislative power. In such circumstances con-
stitutional text as well as executive and congressional practice, quasi-
constitutional custom, 75 could authorize or prevent presidential initiatives. But if
Congress specifically opposed the executive's decision, pushing the case into the
third of Jackson's categories, then the President had to cease his activities or seek
legislative approval.
Youngstown suggested that in all cases involving the economy, the President
would have to seek congressional approval for his actions. Jackson acknowl-
edged the President's broad power to protect the nation from "the outside
world." However, when national security policy involved the economy, Jackson
suggested that claim of inherent presidential power must give way to Congress's
plenary textual power over domestic and foreign commerce. "But, when [the
power] is turned inward, not because of rebellion but because of a lawful eco-
nomic struggle between industry and labor . . . [the executive] should have no
such indulgence" from the Court.7 6 In Youngstown the Court found that Con-
gress had rejected a clause in the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
granting the emergency power Truman claimed, thereby demoting Truman's
72. Id. at 635-37.
73. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981) (Jackson's opinion "brings
together as much combination of analysis and common sense as there is in this area"); Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) ("Justice Jackson summarized the pragmatic, flexible view of
differentiated governmental power to which we are heir"). For a detailed analysis of Jackson's
reasoning, from which the following discussion derives, see KOH, supra note 1, at 107-12.
74. Thus, Jackson read Curtiss-Wright not as a constitutional decision, raising the broad "ques-
tion of the President's power to act without congressional authorization," but as a case that fell into
the first of his three categories, involving "his right to act under and in accord with an Act of
Congress." Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-36 n.2.
75. See KOH, supra note 1, at 70 (defining "quasi-constitutional custom" as "a set of institu-
tional norms generated by the historical interaction of two or more federal branches with one another
*.. [that] represent informal accommodations between two or more branches on the question of who
decides with regard to particular foreign policy matters").
76. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 645.
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action into Jackson's third category. Thus, when national security policies in-
volved the economy, Congress's express powers over commerce and the econ-
omy preserved its preeminent decision-making role.
Often overlooked is that Youngstown not only rejected claims of inherent
presidential authority, but also reaffirmed judicial participation in resolving con-
tested economic and national security questions. None of the Justices claimed
that presidential actions in a state of emergency created political, nonjusticiable
questions. Rather than abstain in such circumstances, Jackson warned, courts
had the duty to "scrutiniz[e] [claims of presidential power] with caution, for
what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system. '
77
Youngstown shows the Court not only refusing to treat domestic and foreign
affairs cases differently, but also refusing to defer to presidential claims of
executive, commander-in-chief, or inherent emergency power. 78 Finally, Young-
stown shows the importance of public accountability in national security policy.
By forcing Presidents to act in the open via the constitutional process, Young-
stown allowed public opinion to be the ultimate judge of the wisdom of presi-
dential policies.79
B. PRESIDENTIAL DOMINANCE IN NATIONAL SECURITY
Although Youngstown reaffirmed the constitutional vision of balanced institu-
tional participation in economics and national security policy, developments
within each branch have promoted a policy trend toward growing presidential
dominance. 80 First, the executive has seized the initiative in policy making,
primarily because it is the best structured to operate in a unified, swift, and secret
manner. Power assigned to Congress, which is often too disorganized for its
effective use, will naturally flow "through the inactions, acquiescences, and
delegations of that body" to the executive, which can act vigorously and com-
prehensively.8 1 As the world has become increasingly multipolar and U.S. he-
gemony has declined, complex and sudden world events have multiplied the
occasions demanding quick responses from the executive branch.
77. Id. at 637.
78. Although some commentators have tried to treat Curtiss-Wright as a foreign affairs case and
Youngstown as a domestic labor dispute, such a formalistic distinction proves untenable. Truman's
domestic steel seizure was undeniably driven by perceived foreign affairs imperatives, and Curtiss-
Wright could just as easily have been characterized as government regulation of a domestic arms sale.
In any event, in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), the entire Court applied Jackson's
Youngstown reasoning to judge a quintessential foreign-affairs issue, the legality of the Iranian
hostage accords.
79. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 653 (when the president acts under delegated authority, in
Jackson category one, the "public may know the extent and limitations of the powers that can be
asserted, and persons affected may be informed from the statute of their rights and duties").
80. See KOH, supra note 1, at 117-49.
81. Charles L. Black, The Working Balance of the American Political Departments, I HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 13, 17, 20 (1980).
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Second, Congress generally has acquiesced in the President's actions even
though it can, when sufficiently energized and organized, act powerfully in
national security affairs. Interest group pressure forces Congress to focus on
pork-barrel concerns, instead of larger separation of powers issues, when con-
sidering economics and national security subjects such as international trade and
military spending. When Congress does focus on larger issues, it often fails to
muster the political fortitude to challenge the President. Not only are individual
members motivated by credit-claiming and blame-avoiding motives, Congress as
a whole suffers serious collective action problems. Only rarely can congressional
opponents muster the necessary two-thirds majority in each house to override a
presidential veto on national security issues, leaving the president largely free to
set policy so long as he can retain the loyalty of thirty-four senators. 8 2 Hence,
while Congress is often highly active, it tends to act aimlessly, ineffectually, or
pursuant to constituent interests, which can easily be trumped by presidential
invocation of national security concerns.
Even when Congress does legislate to check presidential discretion, it all too
often leaves statutory loopholes that the president exploits to unlock sweeping
delegated powers. Post-Vietnam era statutes sought to place a number of controls
on presidential discretion, including requirements of fact findings and public
declarations, committee oversight, legislative vetoes, and reporting and consul-
tation with Congress.8 3 However, these obstacles have proven to be of surprising
little weight, allowing Presidents to evade them either by exploiting their defi-
nitional limits, procedures, and substantive terms, or by challenging their con-
stitutionality in court.8 4 Sunset review of legislation often provides the only
occasion for congressional negotiation with the President.
Third and most forgotten, this is a tale of three branches, not two. Youngstown
notwithstanding, in the post-Vietnam years the federal judiciary has steadily
deferred to, if not expressly affirmed, executive claims of national security
power. In a series of cases during the 1980s the Supreme Court rearranged
Jackson's three-part scheme to permit presidential action in the face of congres-
sional silence.8 5 The Burger and Rehnquist Court's statutory interpretation tech-
niques have eliminated the various limitations in congressional delegations,
thereby granting the President unrestrained access to broad delegated powers
over the economy and national security. Meanwhile, courts have increasingly
82. It is a crippled president indeed who cannot command so few Senators. In the wake of the
Iran-Contra Affair, a weakened lame-duck President Reagan still secured forty-two votes for the
nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court, which was widely viewed as a major presidential
defeat. See 133 CONG. REC. S15,011 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1987).
83. Harold Hongju Koh, Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade Policymaking After
I.N.S. v. Chadha, 18 N.Y.U. J. INTr'L L. & POL. 1911, 1227 (1986).
84. See generally KOH, supra note 1, at 128-31. See also infra parts III.B. & D. (discussing
IEEPA and trade statutes).
85. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981);
Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984) (discussed infra part III.B.).
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resorted to other judicially created doctrines, such as standing, mootness, ripe-
ness, and the political question doctrine, to find national security cases nonjus-
ticiable and beyond judicial competence.
Most notably, in its 1983 decision in I.N.S. v. Chadha the Supreme Court
invalidated the legislative veto, Congress's most effective tool for reining in
presidential discretion. Chadha left delegated power granted by dozens of stat-
utes unchecked except through formal legislation. 86 A number of recent cases
have also defended the President's ability to act to secure national security,
sometimes in the face of statutory language to the contrary. 87 Taken together,
these cases have sharply limited the role of courts as arbiter of the national
policy making process and endorsed, rather than countered, a decision-making
system increasingly characterized by presidential activism and congressional
acquiescence.
III. Legal Regimes of Economic and National Security
The foregoing analysis illuminates both the structure and the evolution of the
modem U.S. statutory scheme governing economics and national security. In a
spectrum of activity spanning regulation of the domestic economy, emergency
economic powers, export and trade policy, and wholly foreign trade, the Con-
stitution assigns Congress primary authority, but a combination of executive
initiative, congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance have gradually
transferred de facto authority to the President. As a result, the President now has
at his disposal a wide range of economic tools to use in protecting national
security. At the same time, Congress and the courts have retained some role in
many of these areas, suggesting the continuing vitality of the Youngstown vision
of balanced institutional participation.
Yet these areas of economic and national security law have changed and de-
veloped over time. Although Jefferson, Lincoln, and FDR exercised many of the
same powers under examination here, they did so pursuant to terse statutes grant-
ing broad powers with few conditions. Current law similarly delegates sweeping
authority to the President, but clothes those statutory grants with numerous con-
ditions and specified goals. These additions not only reflect congressional pref-
erence for use of delegated power, but also reflect a vital difference from pre-World
War II statutes. Where pre-1945 statutes usually granted temporary power tailored
for specific emergencies, today's laws set up comprehensive schemes designed to
86. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). This formalistic result was confirmed in Bowsher
v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), but has been ameliorated by the Court's more recent rulings in
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), and Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). See
KOH, supra note 1, at 143-44.
87. See Japan Whaling Assoc. v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986) (upholding
executive agreement with Japan that allowed whaling as within commerce secretary's statutory
discretion); Dep't of Navy v. Egan, 108 S. Ct. 818 (1988) (presidential control of national security
information inherent in commander-in-chief power).
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coordinate ongoing economic and national security power, reflecting the percep-
tion of an ongoing external threat created by the Cold War.
A. DoMESTic ECONOMIC REGULATION
Domestic economic regulation can have a substantial impact on national se-
curity. Poor economic performance itself may cause national security problems
by reducing defense budgets or producing political instability. Domestic eco-
nomic setbacks also may reduce production of goods necessary for national
defense. Moreover, as national security policy creates foreign economic impli-
cations, the President acquires increasing regulatory authority. This part of the
article explores two methods that allow government regulation of the economy
for national security purposes: first, through the national budget, and second,
through the Defense Production Act. These two sources of law, one constitu-
tional, the other statutory, also mark the endpoints of the spectrum of national
security decision making, characterized at one end by balanced institutional par-
ticipation and at the other end by relatively unchecked executive discretion.
1. National Security and the Budget
For national security purposes a President's most effective economic tool is
often the budget. Unlike other national security areas, the budget principally
involves domestic issues. This encourages vigorous institutional participation
from all three branches, rather than deference to the executive. While the budget
funds defense expenditures, it also serves as a vehicle for congressional inter-
vention into national security policy. However, congressional goals often conflict
with broader presidential strategies. Meanwhile, the courts have felt themselves
competent to adjudicate budget disputes. Thus, the budget process has produced
an open struggle over economics and national security policy among the three
branches, all of which have significant constitutional powers at stake.
Democratic postwar administrations have used the budget for Keynesian
growth policies on the assumption that a booming economy would pay for
expansive national security commitments. Presidents Truman, Kennedy and
Johnson linked an expansive policy of containment, a "symmetric response"
strategy that sought to meet communist attacks everywhere, with a fiscally liberal
budget policy. They believed that a large Cold War military establishment could
be funded without sacrificing the U.S. standard of living by using Keynesian
techniques to push the economy toward full employment. The seminal planning
document that set out the containment policy, NSC-68, declared: "the American
economy, when it operates at a level approaching full efficiency, can provide
enormous resources for purposes other than civilian consumption while simul-
taneously providing a higher standard of living." 8 8
88. NSC-68, April 14, 1950, in 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNrTED STATEs: 1950, at 243-44,
quoted in GADDIS, supra note 68, at 93.
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Thus, those administrations saw not only defense budgets, but also overall
federal spending as crucial for national security. In contrast, Republican Presi-
dents Eisenhower and Nixon adopted a more restrained policy of containment, an
"asymmetric" response strategy that disavowed meeting the Soviet threat ev-
erywhere. Instead, these Presidents sought to strengthen vital areas of U.S.
interest by linking containment to fiscally conservative budgetary policies. Their
perception of fixed domestic economic means led their administrations to adopt
more limited national security policies. 89 Moreover, their party's failure to con-
trol Congress undermined their ability to devise a coherent policy that fully
integrated budgetary and national security policy.
Congress's appropriations power provides the Legislature with perhaps its
most effective instrument for controlling executive discretion. Congress can use
its exclusive power of the purse to determine defense budgets, cut off foreign
aid, or block expenditure of funds for presidential national security goals, such
as funding the Nicaraguan contras. However, in former Senate Armed Services
Committee Chairman Barry Goldwater's words, the budget process "distorts the
nature of congressional oversight.'"'9 Members tend to focus on constituency-
related items, such as defense spending in their districts, or procurement scandals
that have public appeal. As a result, the appropriations process leads Congress to
concentrate on the structure of national security, how the armed services are
financed, supplied, etc., rather than questioning the President's national security
strategy.
Myopia is the least of Congress's afflictions in the budget arena. In customary
practice and in Supreme Court decisions the executive and the judiciary have
circumscribed congressional appropriation decisions. Statutes have granted the
President "drawdown" authority, allowing him to withdraw appropriated funds
if he deems it vital to the national security. Additional statutes have granted him
access to special contingency funds for national security purposes, while still
other laws grant him transfer or reprogramming authority to shift funds within
appropriation accounts. These tools give the President the freedom to withdraw
or spend new funds in support of his national security agenda. President Reagan
showed the extent of this freedom when he used his drawdown and reprogram-
ming authority to continue military aid in Central America over Congress's
opposition. 91
While Presidents have expanded their power through budgetary loopholes, the
judiciary has limited Congress's power of the purse. In two cases the Supreme
Court has struck down appropriations that have infringed on the plenary powers
of other branches or have violated constitutional rights. In United States v. Klein
89. GADDIS, supra note 68, at 354-55.
90. PRESIDENT'S BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON DEFENSE MANAGEMENT, AN INTERIM REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT 5 (1986), quoted in AMOS A. JORDAN, ET AL., AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY 113 (3d
ed. 1989).
91. KOH, supra note 1, at 131.
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the Court held that Congress could not use appropriations to block presidential
use of his plenary pardon power.9 2 In United States v. Lovett the Court invali-
dated spending legislation that sought to affect a bill of attainder in violation of
article I, section 9.93 Some courts have suggested that Congress also cannot use
appropriations to prevent the President from exercising his plenary, enumerated
foreign affairs powers. In a now-vacated opinion one district court has even held
that spending bills cannot preclude executive use of its unenumerated foreign
affairs powers. 94
Nevertheless, the budgetary story remains one of balanced institutional par-
ticipation. All three branches play an active role in funding the government's
operations. The executive proposes a budget and executes spending laws. Con-
gress appropriates money, often with strings attached, that enacts its own na-
tional security desires. Finally, the Supreme Court ensures that the spending laws
do not violate separation of powers or constitutional rights.95 In that sense all
three branches play an active role in setting a spending policy that directly affects
national security.
96
2. The Defense Production Act of 1950
The Defense Production Act (DPA) 97 tells a dramatically different story, one
of almost unlimited executive power. The DPA, passed during the onset of the
Korean War as an ostensibly temporary measure for mobilizing the economy,
represents a vast source of national security power for presidential control over
the economy. As the Cold War deepened, America's constant wartime footing
required congressional extension of the DPA until the present day. As a result,
Congress has kept in place a wartime statute granting the president "a sweeping
delegation of power" to mobilize the economy.98
The DPA's chief focus is on industrial production and capacity. The statutory
language, virtually unchanged since 1950, directs the President to mobilize
industrial production for defense needs and to "assure domestic energy sup-
plies" so as "to insure the national defense preparedness which is essential to
national security." 99 Congress also declared that the President should seek to
expand "productive capacity and supply beyond the levels needed to meet the
civilian demand," so as to "reduce the time required for full mobilization." '1°°
92. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
93. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
94. Federal Employees v. United States, 688 F. Supp. 671 (D.D.C. 1988), vacated and re-
manded sub nom. American Foreign Serv. Ass'n v. Garflinkel, 109 S. Ct. 1693 (1989) (per curiam).
95. See also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
96. For further elaboration, see Kate Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343
(1988).
97. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2061 et seq. (1988).
98. Note, The Defense Production Act: Choice as to Allocations, 51 CoLuM. L. REv. 350 (1951).
99. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2062 (1990).
100. Id.
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In order to establish "a broad and divers[e] mobilization base" that will keep up
with changes in "technology and strategy," Congress decided to grant the Pres-
ident sweeping economic powers to make the economy's most basic purchasing
and investment decisions. 10 1 A 1980 Senate report said: "The [DPA] is the sole
statutory vehicle for insuring that the Nation's industrial base is kept in a state of
readiness in peacetime."1
0 2
The DPA grants the President a number of powers to use in mobilizing the
economy. First, the President can order industry to give priority to contracts
"which he deems necessary or appropriate to promote the national defense" over
civilian contracts. 10 3 Second, the President can "allocate materials and facilities
in such manner, upon such conditions, and to such extent" as he thinks necessary
for national security. 104 Third, the DPA authorizes the President to guarantee
loans both to government contractors and to private businesses for the expansion
of capacity, research and development, and exploration. o
Beyond these central powers, the DPA grants the President other authority
with significant economic and national security implications. The DPA forbids
individuals or corporations from hoarding materials designated by the president
as scarce. 106 The DPA allows the President to exempt from antitrust suit coop-
erative industry agreements and programs to meet government production re-
quirements. 107 Finally, the DPA permits the President to implement a purchase
program for minerals, metals, and other materials, and to encourage natural
resources exploration. 1
0 8
Recent amendments have extended the President's DPA powers to reach for-
eign economic actors as well. In 1988 Congress extended the President's DPA
powers to cover domestic financial transactions involving foreign buyers by
passing the now-famous Exon-Florio provision. Exon-Florio gives the President
the power to investigate and to "suspend or prohibit" on national security
grounds any foreign merger with, or acquisition of, a U.S. entity. To date the
President has exercised that power only once, preventing the acquisition of a
Washington-based aircraft parts manufacturer by a Chinese-controlled corpora-
tion.' 0 9 Although the Defense Production Act is still awaiting reauthorization
101. S. REP. No. 2237, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1956), reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2930,
2931; see also S. REP. No. 408, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953), reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1746,
1750.
102. S. REP. No. 96-166, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1743,
1744 1744.
103. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071 (1990).
104. Id.
105. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2091-2092 (1990).
106. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2072 (1990).
107. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2158 (1990).
108. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2093 (1990).
109. Andrew Rosenthal, Bush Urged to Void Sale of Airplane-Parts Maker to Chinese, N.Y.
TIMs, Feb. 2, 1990, at A9.
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after lapsing in 1990, President Bush signed legislation in August 1991 perma-
nently enacting the DPA's Exon-Florio provisions. 110
With these statutory authorizations in hand, the President can wield enormous
power over the economy to satisfy national security requirements. He can force
companies to stop civilian production altogether and divert their energies toward
government contracts. He can order industry to manufacture goods they would
otherwise not choose to produce, such as when President Johnson ordered chem-
ical companies to produce Agent Orange. Under the DPA the President can
determine which industries would receive crucial raw materials and components
and how to organize each sector of the economy. Used to the hilt, DPA powers
could theoretically place the President in the position of single-handedly making
the economy's major market decisions.
Significantly, Congress placed few controls on the DPA's most sweeping pro-
visions. The DPA does not require a declaration of war or a state of emergency
before releasing to the President authority to give federal contracts priority or to
allocate industrial resources. Nor did Congress obligate the President to consult
or report on the use of these powers.' While Congress did include an unusual
legislative veto provision that would have allowed both houses by concurrent
resolution to terminate entirely the DPA, Chadha rendered that device meaning-
less. As a result, the only congressional constraint on the President's discretion
has been a primitive sunset provision that has required the DPA's renewal every
two or three years. The perils of that course revealed themselves during the
Persian Gulf War, when Congress allowed the DPA to expire, forcing President
Bush to cobble together a patchwork of statutory authorities to replace critical
DPA powers.1
12
The federal judiciary has also failed to place checks on the President's DPA
authority. In the few cases challenging executive action under the DPA the courts
have ignored claims of unconstitutionality and instead upheld the President's use
of the DPA to order the economy. In a case arising out of the Korean War, the
Supreme Court turned away an aircraft manufacturer's challenge to price and
wage controls promulgated pursuant to the DPA. 113 Refusing to entertain claims
that the DPA violated the nondelegation doctrine, the unanimous Court required
the appellants to exhaust all administrative procedures. In the late days of the
Vietnam War, Eastern Air Lines brought suit against an aircraft manufacturer for
110. Defense Production Act Extension and Amendments of 1991, 105 Stat. 487, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991).
111. However, some of the less central provisions of the DPA do require the president to make
certain findings of national security need or scarcity and direct him to report to Congress after he has
acted.
112. Exec. Order No. 12742, 56 Fed. Reg. 1079 (1991); see U.S. Is Left Without Law to Cover
Oil Emergencies, N.Y. TmEs, Dec. 17, 1990, at Dl.
113. Allen v. Grand Central Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535, 553 (1954). Allen involved DPA powers,
since eliminated at President Truman's request, to impose wage and price controls.
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failing to deliver airplanes on time.11 4 The Fifth Circuit found the defendant not
liable for nonperformance of the contract because the Johnson administration,
pursuant to the DPA, had informally ordered the aircraft manufacturer to give
military orders priority. 115 The judiciary has yet to rule against presidential use
of DPA authority.
Hence, the regulation of the economy for national security reasons proceeds
under two markedly different regimes. Under the budgetary process, a system of
balanced institutional participation sets economic and national security priorities.
Congressional appropriations exert significant influence over the domestic econ-
omy, and, because of the growing relationship between economic strength and
national defense, over national security as well. In contrast, under the DPA
Congress has granted the President sweeping unilateral powers to mobilize the
economy in peacetime. As with other laws involving economics and national
security, Congress has failed to place significant checks on executive use of its
delegated power. However, the President has seldom used his DPA powers,
suggesting that Congress's strong interest in domestic economic regulation acts
as an important political restraint upon his executive discretion.
B. EMERGENCY POWERS
Presidential emergency powers derive primarily from statute. Even though
Presidents from Lincoln to Truman sometimes claimed an inherent executive
emergency power, they continued to seek subsequent congressional approval for
their actions. Moreover, in Youngstown, the one case in which the President
claimed inherent constitutional emergency power in the face of congressional
opposition, the Supreme Court resoundingly invalidated the executive action.
Although the executive branch continues to claim such power, 116 it has not
needed to rely on it due to generous congressional delegation of authority. Al-
though Congress has tried to limit presidential emergency powers, Presidents
have succeeded in maintaining wide discretion when it comes to declaring an
emergency and applying emergency powers.
Two statutes, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977
(IEEPA) and the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 (TWEA), provide the
President with broad powers to regulate the economy for national security pur-
poses.117 TWEA gave the executive the authority to freeze and seize assets and
to block or regulate all international transactions, simply by declaring a national
114. Eastern Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1976).
115. However, in a third case, In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740,
844 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), a district court held that the DPA only immunized defense contractors from
breach of contract damages.
116. Witness, for example, some of the remarkable assertions of executive power made during
the Iran-contra affair. See KOH, supra note 1, at 113-16.
117. Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 415 (1917), (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C. app. §§ 1-6, 7-39, 41-44 (1989)) (hereinafter TWEA).
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emergency (or war).' 18 This simple requirement made TWEA one of the most
potent economic and national security options available. As noted above, FDR
used TWEA to effect a banking holiday, while Truman used TWEA during the
Korean war to seize property and commodities.
In a far-reaching regulation of economics and national security, President
Nixon resorted to TWEA in 1971 to implement his New Economic Policy. In
issuing his order Nixon explicitly linked international economic affairs with U.S.
national security, stating that: "[T]here has been a prolonged decline in the
international monetary reserves of the United States, and our trade and interna-
tional competitive position is seriously threatened and, as a result, our continued
ability to assure our security could be impaired."1 19
To stop the loss in monetary reserves and declining trade balance, Nixon
declared a national emergency, suspended the dollar's convertibility into gold,
and imposed a 10 percent surcharge on most imports. In 1975, the Customs
Court upheld the President's TWEA imposition of the import surcharge in
United States v. Yoshida International. 120 Describing the TWEA's delegation of
power as "broad and extensive," Judge Markey wrote: "[I]t could not have been
otherwise if the President were to have, within constitutional boundaries, the
flexibility required to meet problems surrounding a national emergency with the
success desired by Congress."'
2 1
In the wake of Watergate and Vietnam Congress moved in the mid-1970s to
control executive abuse of the TWEA. It sought to reform emergency powers by
enacting statutes whose framework would define the branches' powers and es-
tablish elaborate procedures for initiating and continuing emergency powers.
First, Congress passed the National Emergencies Act (NEA), 122 which required
public declaration of national emergencies and subsequent presidential reporting.
The NEA also allowed congressional termination of an emergency by concurrent
resolution (another now-unconstitutional legislative veto). Second, Congress
passed the IEEPA, which limited TWEA to wartime. However, the IEEPA did
delegate emergency powers in peacetime upon a presidential finding of an "un-
usual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part
outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy or economy of
the United States." 1
23
Congress placed further checks on presidential discretion to use emergency
powers. The IEEPA conditioned exercise of its authority upon prior congres-
sional consultation and subsequent congressional review, while the NEA pro-
118. Id.
119. Proclamation No. 4074, 85 Stat. 926 (1971). For a detailed discussion of Nixon's interna-
tional economic policies, see DAVID P. CAL±Eo, THE IMPERIOUS ECONOMY 62-102 (1982).
120. United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
121. Id. at 573.
122. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1621-1622 (1989).
123. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. V 1989).
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vided for the termination of emergencies by legislative veto. Once the President
satisfied these conditions, the IEEPA granted him powers almost as broad as
those contained in the TWEA. Pursuant to the IEEPA, the President could
prohibit any transactions using foreign exchange and "investigate, regulate,
direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit" the transportation, export,
import, or other transaction involving property owned by foreign governments or
nationals.' 24 Not only do the President's IEEPA orders reign supreme throughout
the land, they also apply to any person "subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States," ' 125 a phrase that potentially encompasses U.S. citizens, corporations,
and U.S.-owned property overseas.
In the past fifteen years Presidents have regularly sidestepped congressional
restrictions, gaining access to IEEPA's broad grants of authority with almost no
congressional opposition. They have declared national emergencies with little
regard to whether a real emergency has actually existed. 126 President Reagan even
used the IEEPA to continue policies Congress failed to approve. In 1983, 1984,
and again in 1990, Presidents invoked the IEEPA sanctions to maintain export
controls and foreign boycotts because Congress did not reauthorize the Export
Administration Act. In invoking the IEEPA the Reagan Administration simply
noted that the legislature's failure to renew the EAA had left unchecked a threat
to U.S. national security: a find that liberally construed the statutory requirement
that the threat originate at least substantially outside the United States. 
1 27
Presidents have not only construed IEEPA's definitions broadly, but have also
expansively read its delegated powers to execute national security policies. In the
Iranian hostage crisis, for instance, President Carter used the IEEPA to freeze
some $12 billion in Iranian assets in the United States and in the possession of
U.S. corporations at home or abroad. Other executive orders pursuant to the
IEEPA blocked off all trade with Iran, halted any financial transactions with Iran,
and limited travel to Iran except for journalists. 128 In order to secure the release
of the hostages in Teheran, Presidents Carter and Reagan used the IEEPA to
transfer billions of dollars back to Iran, lift judicial attachments on Iranian assets,
and suspend private legal claims against Iran. 129 Nowhere did the IEEPA grant
Presidents the power to seize or transfer private claims against foreign assets.
124. 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (1990).
125. Id.
126. Of the different countries against which the United States has used IEEPA sanctions-Iran,
Libya, Nicaragua, South Africa, Panama, and Iraq/Kuwait-only Iran and Iraq/Kuwait could be said
to have constituted unusual and extraordinary threats. See BARRY E. CARTER, INTERNATIONAL Eco-
NOMIC SANCT'nONS: IMPROVING THE HAPHAzARD U.S. LEoAL REGIME 197-203 (1988).
127. Exec. Order No. 12,444, 3 C.F.R. 168 (1983); Exec. Order No. 12,470, 3 C.F.R. 168
(1984) (in both orders, which were worded almost identically, the President cited the need to
"exercise the necessary vigilance" over exports to safeguard the national security); see also Exec.
Order 12,730 (1990).
128. Exec. Order 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (1979); Exec. Order 12,205, 3 C.F.R. 348 (1981).
129. Exec. Order No. 12,227, 3 C.F.R. 105 (1982); Exec. Order No. 12,294, 3 C.F.R. 139
(1982).
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Such presidential action went unchecked because of congressional and judicial
failure to stop executive abuses of IEEPA. Although the executive has perfunc-
torily reported on the status of emergencies, Congress has neither reviewed nor
considered terminating them. 130 The federal courts have done even more to
weaken the restraints on presidential emergency powers. 13 1 In Dames & Moore
v. Regan the Supreme Court upheld President Carter's use of the IEEPA to
nullify judicial attachments, transfer frozen Iranian assets, and suspend private
claims against Iran as part of the deal to release U.S. hostages held by Iran. 1
32
Following Youngstown the Court could have construed the IEEPA's failure ex-
pressly to authorize suspension of claims as congressional silence, placing the
acts in Justice Jackson's category two, or as implicit disapproval for such acts,
dropping them into Jackson's disfavored third category. Yet Justice Rehnquist,
writing in Dames & Moore, instead found that unchecked executive practice,
IEEPA's grant of other powers, another statute (the Hostage Act), and congres-
sional silence constituted an implied congressional approval of the President's
unilateral suspension of private claims. In so doing Rehnquist dramatically re-
drew Jackson's three Youngstown categories, effectively merging category two,
where the President's actions are at their twilight because of congressional si-
lence, into category one, where the President is deemed to act with express or
implied congressional approval. 133
Two subsequent Burger Court decisions further boosted and consolidated
presidential emergency powers. In Chadha, the Court struck down the legislative
veto for failing to comport with article I's bicameralism and presentment re-
quirements. 134 Legislative veto provisions were central to the NEA and IEEPA.
Without them Congress would need a two-thirds majority, rather than a simple
majority, to override any use of IEEPA powers (given the near-certainty of a
presidential veto of a joint resolution). A year later, in Regan v. Wald, the Court
upheld the President's power to block travel to Cuba under IEEPA's grandfather
clause, which had maintained TWEA sanctions in force since 1977.135 Thus, in
Dames & Moore, Chadha, and Wald the Court expansively construed presiden-
tial emergency powers, while at the same time hindering Congress's ability to
rein in those powers.' 
36
Emergency powers have remained a bastion of presidential dominance in
economics and national security largely because of the failure of the other two
130. Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1416
(1989).
131. See, e.g., Beacon Prods. Corp. v. Reagan, 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987) (upholding presiden-
tial IEEPA regulations barring trade with Nicaragua).
132. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
133. What made Justice Rehnquist's ruling all the more ironic was that he was Justice Jackson's
law clerk when Youngstown was decided. See WtLLIAi H. REHNQUtST, THE SUPREME COURT: How
IT WAS, How IT Is 64 (1987).
134. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
135. Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984).
136. KOH, supra note 1, at 138-43 (further discussing these cases).
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branches to check the executive. Although Congress has attempted to place
restraints on the use of such authority, they have proved largely ineffective.
Presidents have used their discretionary powers to avoid the requirement of an
"unusual and extraordinary threat," gaining access to broad, indefinite statutory
grants of authority. 137 Congress has generally shown neither the institutional nor
the political will to stop the President. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has
deferred to expansive interpretations of IEEPA power and struck down the leg-
islative veto that checked that power. As a result, Congress and the Court have
encouraged the President to act first, relying on existing statutory "blank-check
delegations," while avoiding the more politically difficult, though constitution-
ally preferred, route of seeking specific legislative approval for emergency
acts. 138
C. EXPORT POLICY
A President's control over export policy extends almost as far as his authority
over emergency powers. As enacted principally through the Export Administra-
tion Act (EAA),' 39 U.S. export policy has sought three national security goals:
first, to prevent domestic shortages of critical materials (short supply); second,
to channel exports to important allies such as Western Europe and Japan (foreign
policy); and third, to prevent military and strategic goods and technologies from
reaching hostile countries, such as the former Soviet Union (national secu-
rity). 14 The United States also has organized a multilateral organization, the
Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom), to enforce
common national security export controls among its Western European and Jap-
anese allies.
Until recently U.S. export laws underwent little change since World War II.
Like the IEEPA, the EAA and other export statutes invest the President with
wide discretion which Congress and the courts have allowed him to use virtually
unchecked. U.S. laws provide no right to export; instead, they prohibit all
exports except those licensed by the executive branch. Pursuant to the EAA, the
executive branch promulgates the U.S. Commodities Control List, which is a list
of products and technologies and authorized target countries for exports. The
EAA further requires Commerce Department pre-approval for the export of
more than 240 different types of goods, including transportation equipment,
electronic equipment, and petrochemical equipment. The Commerce Depart-
137. Id. at 47.
138. Id. at 45-48, 140.
139. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401 et seq. (1988).
140. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2420 (1989). See generally COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, ENGINEERING,
AND PUBLIC POLICY (U.S.), PANEL ON THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL SECURITY CONTROLS ON INTERNA-
TIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, BALANCING THE NATIONAL INTEREST: U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY Ex-
PORT CONTROLS AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC COMPETITION 70-101 (1987).
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ment grants less sensitive items on the list a general license, allowing shipment
to most countries, but prevents or limits the export of more sensitive items by
granting a validated license. This grants permission only for single or multiple
transactions. Many of these goods are known as "dual-use" items because a
hostile country could potentially put them to military use. Moreover, the Defense
Department examines and may block export of military goods and technologies
that it has placed on its Munitions List.
Generally speaking, the President can block any shipment he believes threat-
ens U.S. national security in three ways. First, he can stop export of any good
if he believes it "would make a significant contribution to the military potential
of any other country or combination of countries which would prove detrimental
to the national security of the United States." 14 1 Second, he can block the export
of goods that would drain the domestic economy of important national security
materials. 1 42 Finally, he can stop exports if doing so will "further significantly
the foreign policy of the United States." 143 Thus, the EAA gives the President
the ability to block most exports to certain nations or to control the shipment of
specific technologies and goods to any country. This power provides the Presi-
dent with an effective weapon for economic warfare, one he can use unhindered.
Like the TWEA, the export laws initially placed few checks on the President's
broad powers. The EAA provided for no congressional say in placing or lifting
export sanctions. Instead, it simply required the President to meet certain stat-
utory definitions before exercising his authority. Moreover, the statute specifi-
cally excludes the courts from the export licensing process, saying that decisions
of the Secretary of Commerce shall not be "subject to judicial review." 144 This
allows the President to exercise essentially unchecked discretion in deciding
when to block the export of a certain good or to prohibit all exports to a certain
country on national security or foreign policy grounds. Similar provisions give
the President even broader latitude in controlling the export of military or nuclear
technologies and products. 145 Arguably, the export control laws give the Presi-
dent even more discretionary power than under the IEEPA.
In 1979 and 1985, Congress amended the EAA in order to restrain presidential
discretion. To create periodic reconsideration of sanctions, the 1979 act required
their termination after only one year. If the President chooses to renew the
controls, he must notify Congress and determine that the original grounds for
imposing them still exist. The President also must determine the foreign avail-
141. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2)(A) (1989).
142. Id. § 2402(2)(C).
143. Id. § 2402(2)(B).
144. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2412(e) (1989).
145. See, e.g., Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq. (1989);
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, 22 U.S.C. § 3201 (1989) (controlling export of nuclear
material and technology); Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2754 (1989) (controlling exports
of military arms, equipment and services).
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ability of controlled goods and the likely success of sanctions. 146 The 1979 Act
included a now-defunct legislative veto for foreign policy controls that applied to
agricultural products and controls imposed because of domestic short sup-
plies. 147 In 1985 Congress tightened the reins further, requiring the President to
consult Congress before imposing foreign policy sanctions. Noting that the Con-
stitution gave Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce, Congress
hoped more consultation would lead to "greater deliberation . . . by the Presi-
dent" and "wiser control policies enjoying greater Congressional support." 148
But Presidents Carter and Reagan easily avoided these checks. They routinely
renewed export controls and expanded sanctions after consultation with Con-
gress that was "perfunctory at best." 149 Moreover, the Chadha decision struck
down the 1979 Act's legislative veto provision, which required Congress to
muster a two-thirds vote to override presidential export controls. 150 As in the
case of emergency powers, Chadha had the effect of freeing the President's
hand, this time with regard to foreign policy and domestic short supply controls.
Given the President's wide latitude in defining what constitutes a national secu-
rity or foreign policy problem, export controls have become a favorite economic
tool for presidential economic warfare.
Events during the Afghanistan war and the Soviet crackdown in Poland high-
lighted these themes. In response to the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
President Carter, invoking the EAA, imposed an embargo on many products to
the Soviet Union. Carter not only prohibited the sale of high technology to the
Soviets, he also extended the embargo to agricultural products such as wheat,
chicken, truffles, and to any goods, technology, or financial support for the 1980
Olympic Games in Moscow. Although strong resistance to these controls erupted
both in Congress and the agricultural sector, Congress could do nothing to stop
the export sanctions, although in later legislation it tried to place further controls
on the use of agricultural embargoes.'
5
'
In 1982 President Reagan used export controls even more expansively, this
time to counter Soviet repression in Poland. Unable to win multilateral economic
sanctions against the Soviets, Reagan ordered controls placed on the export of oil
and natural gas equipment and technology to the Soviet Union. 152 Specifically,
the controls aimed at preventing completion of the Urengoy natural gas pipeline
from the Soviet Union to Western Europe, a project the Soviets wanted urgently
146. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(b) (1989).
147. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2406(g)(3) (1982).
148. H. R. REP. No. 180, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1985). The 1985 amendments also direct the
president to consult with the CoCom allies and affected American industries.
149. CARTER, supra note 126, at 72.
150. See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
151. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. app. 88 240 4(g), 2406(g)(3)(A) (1989).
152. See Amendment of Oil and Gas Controls to the U.S.S.R., 47 Fed. Reg. 27,250 (1982) (to
be codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 376, 279, 385).
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to complete for foreign exchange and foreign policy reasons. 153 The Reagan
administration also sought to extend the sanctions extraterritorially, finding sup-
port in the EAA's authorization of controls over any good "subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States or exported by any person subject to the juris-
diction of the United States." 1 54 As a result, Commerce Department regulations
expanded the embargo to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms and to independent
foreign companies exporting products made with U.S.-licensed technology.1 55
While the 1982 pipeline demonstrated the broad power available to the Pres-
ident under the EAA, it also revealed the limits of that power. Substantial
opposition to the sanctions arose in Congress and from U.S. industry. Although
Congress failed to pass two bills repealing the sanctions, a narrow 206-203 vote
in the House expressed Congress's strong discontent. U.S. companies chal-
lenged the sanctions in court, only to be turned away by the federal judiciary. 156
However, a Dutch district court found that the extraterritorial reach of the export
controls violated international law. 157 More powerful resistance came from the
Western European governments. Many EC countries encouraged their companies
to continue their Soviet contracts, and France directly ordered U.S. subsidiaries
to perform their pipeline-related work. The Commerce Department responded by
cutting off performing companies from all U.S. exports. European companies
continued to perform their contracts and the Soviet pipeline work went on. Faced
with the ineffectiveness of the Commerce Department's sanctions, congressional
and industry criticism, and most importantly, stiff allied resistance, President
Reagan repealed the export controls after only five months. 1 58
Although President Reagan suffered a setback in 1982, the story on export
laws remains similar to the one on emergency powers. The President retains
broad discretion to cut off exports to any country, as long as it would further
U.S. national security and foreign policy goals. Congressional attempts to place
statutory checks on this broad delegation of power have failed. Presidents have
expansively defined threats to national security, generously interpreted statutory
grants of powers, and have been constrained only by non-onerous notification
and consultation requirements. Congress has been unable to respond, while the
courts have stayed out of export matters. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the
basic premises of U.S. export control have been shattered, and the objectives of
the entire CoCom system are being rethought. But the lesson remains the same:
153. The incident is recounted in HENRY J. STEINER & DErLEV F. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
PROBLEMS MATERIALS AND ITxrs 947 (3d ed. 1986).
154. 50 U.S.C. § 2405(a) (1989).
155. See 47 Fed. Reg. at 27,250.
156. Dresser Indus. v. Baidridge, 549 F. Supp. 108 (D.D.C. 1982) (denying motion for tempo-
rary restraining order). President Reagan rescinded the export regulations before the court could rule
on the merits.
157. Compagnie Europenne des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B. V., 22 I.L.M. 66 (1982).
158. See Revision of Export Controls Affecting the U.S.S.R. and Poland, 47 Fed. Reg. 51,858
(1982) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 379, 385, 390, 399).
FALL 1992
750 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
the export laws have provided another powerful economic weapon for the .pursuit
of national security goals, which the President may wield largely at his own
discretion.
D. IMPORT LAWS
Unlike emergency power and exports, imports have historically won intense
congressional involvement. Trade laws include more than national security con-
cerns; equally at stake are whether certain industries and jobs will receive pro-
tection from foreign competition. Powerful constituency groups have pressured
Congress to take an aggressive role in setting trade policy, where it holds the
enumerated powers to lay "duties, imposts and excises" and to regulate inter-
national commerce. 159 Such pressure has pushed Congress to assert its dominant
constitutional role in setting trade policy. However, executive initiative and
structural superiority, the same institutional factors that have produced broad
delegations in the areas of emergency powers and export controls, have spurred
similarly broad delegations of trade powers to the President.
Global interdependence has made the impact of international trade more ap-
parent upon both the domestic economy and national security. Importantly, the
constitutional form of international trade agreements ensures that Congress will
always have substantial input into trade policy. Such agreements have generally
taken the form of either treaties consented to by two-thirds of the Senate, a
congressional-executive agreement pre-approved by legislation, or a congres-
sional-executive agreement implemented by post-negotiation legislation. While
Presidents have traditionally been less protectionist than Congress, their stance
often generates weaker interest group support. At the same time, Presidents have
at their disposal a rarely invoked, controversial constitutional power to enter
"sole" executive agreements independent of Congress through the exercise of
their plenary authority. These divergent trade ideologies and competing interests
have led to an ongoing struggle between the President and Congress over import
policy.
1. Trade Negotiations and Agreements
In the recent past Congress has sought to increase controls over trade policy
even as the executive branch has sought greater independence. Initially, Con-
gress controlled all trade decisions, as reflected in the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act
of 1930,16° which set unprecedently high tariffs for all imported goods without
presidential input. 161 Smoot-Hawley's disastrous aftermath, the collapse of
159. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 1.
160. Act of June 17, 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590.
161. Harold Hongju Koh, Congressional Controls on Presidential Policymaking After I.N.S. v.
Chadha, 18 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 1191, 1194 (1986). See generally ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD,
TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITIcAL ENDS (1983) [hereinafter TRADE CONTROLS]; ANDREAS F. LowEN-
FELD, PUBLIC CONTROLS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1983) [hereinafter PUBLIC CONTROLS].
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world trade that spurred the Depression, convinced the New Deal Congress to
delegate broad authority to FDR to negotiate and conclude reciprocal tariff-
reducing trade agreements. 
162
Even as it granted FDR broad authority over the domestic economy, the New
Deal Congress jealously maintained controls over presidential decision making
on trade. In the 1934 Act Congress enacted simple, yet effective, sunset provi-
sions that terminated the President's authority after two or three years. These
provisions allowed Congress to review and extract changes in executive trade
agreements in return for renewing presidential authority. Trade agreements under
the 1934 Act flourished. Presidents negotiated thirty-two bilateral agreements
between 1935 and 1945 and the Act allowed for U.S. entry into the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The courts supported this combination
of delegated authority with sunset review, turning aside claims that such presi-
dential authority violated the nondelegation doctrine.
1 63
Increasingly, postwar Presidents sought greater discretion to negotiate trade
pacts that went beyond tariffs. In response Congress tightened controls over
negotiating authority to forestall unilateral presidential trade decisions via exec-
utive agreement. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 reflected these fears. Con-
gress granted the President advance negotiating authority, but required submis-
sion of multilateral trade agreements for congressional approval. 164 By the late
1960s, congressional-executive conflict over trade led Congress to withhold
further renewals of delegated authority, undermining presidential credibility in
nontariff trade barrier negotiations.
By the early 1970s, Vietnam and Watergate made Congress even more wary
of unbridled presidential discretion, leading to an innovative restructuring of
trade policymaking. First, to address problems of the President's negotiating
credibility, Congress enacted a "fast-track" procedure in the Trade Act of 1974.
The fast track gave the President advance negotiating authority, but required him
to notify the relevant congressional committees ninety days before entering the
agreement. In exchange, Congress altered its internal rules to review the agree-
ment quickly and without amendment. 165
Aside from structuring presidential authority, the 1974 Act also included a
number of congressional controls on executive discretion. First, the Act specified
negotiating goals. 166 Second, Congress subjected the President's negotiating
authority to a sunset provision. Third, the Act required pre-negotiation consul-
tations and post-negotiation reporting and certifications to Congress. Fourth,
162. See Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-316, 48 Stat. 943 (1934).
163. See Star-Kist Foods v. United States, 275 F.2d 472 (C.C.P.A. 1959) (upholding President's
12.5 percent reduction of tariffs on Icelandic tuna imports pursuant to 1934 act).
164. Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (1962).
165. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2112, 2191 (1982).
166. For these and other congressional controls, see generally Koh, supra note 161, at 1204-08;
Koh, The Fast Track and U.S. Trade Policy, 18 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 143 (1992) (hereinafter Fast
Track).
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Congress sought to judicialize trade questions, specifically by giving private
parties the right to bring complaints against foreign industry in courts and within
the executive branch. Finally, Congress included several legislative vetoes to
override disfavored presidential decisions.
Ironically, Chadha's elimination of the legislative veto has spurred Congress
to intervene even further into trade policy. In the 1984 Trade Act 167 Congress
modified the fast-track provision to add a "committee gatekeeping" procedure.
This requires the President to submit an agreement to congressional committees
sixty days before the 1974 Act's ninety-day requirement and grants expedited
procedures only if neither committee disapproves. This forces the executive to
consult with the committees and preserves each house's ability to vote against the
pact. Under this scheme the House Ways and Means and the Senate Finance
Committees retain a power functionally analogous to the legislative veto. If
either gatekeeper committee decides to vote against the agreement, it effectively
ends the pact's chances, because without the fast-track procedure an agreement
would be subject to procedural delays and "Christmas-tree" amendments. 168 The
subsequently concluded United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement proved the
versatility of fast track as a procedural device to secure congressional-executive
cooperation in the management of U.S. international trade policy. 169
Success in the U.S.-Canada pact inspired Congress to make the fast track the
central mechanism in both bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations. In the
1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act Congress extended the Presi-
dent's negotiating authority for five years and re-authorized the fast track subject
to renewal every three years. 170 Moreover, changes wrought by the 1988 Act
thrust Congress even deeper into trade policymaking.
In addition to the committee gatekeeping procedure, which governs initial
access to the fast track, the 1988 Act added a one-house extension disapproval
procedure. Through this procedure, the fast track could attach to bills submitted
after May 31, 1991, but only if neither house of Congress had passed a disap-
proval resolution reported out of the Senate Finance Committee and jointly out
of the House Ways and Means and Rules Committees. In addition, the 1988 Act
provided a "reverse fast track" mechanism, a two-house derailment procedure,
which allowed the gatekeeping committees to submit resolutions that if approved
by both houses would terminate fast track. Congress included this provision
specifically to ensure continuing executive-congressional cooperation, because
the resolution can only be passed on the grounds that the President had "failed
167. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, P.L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948.
168. Koh, supra note 161, at 1216-17.
169. See Harold Hongju Koh, History of the Fast Track Approval Mechanism, in JUDTH H.
BELLO & ALAN F. HOLMES, GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES-CANADA FREE-TRADE AGREEMENT
§ 1.01-.03 (1990).
170. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107
(1988).
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or refused to consult with Congress on trade negotiations and trade agreements
in accordance with" the 1988 Act.
71
To date, the 1988 Act has maintained presidential negotiating authority while
preserving channels of communication between the executive and legislative
branches. This delicate balance has been maintained at considerable cost, how-
ever, as illustrated by the defeat in May 1991 of efforts to disapprove extension
of fast track for both the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFrA) and
the Uruguay Round accords. 172 The result has been an unusually open public
debate over the goals of U.S. trade policy, but one fought out, ironically enough,
on the battleground of procedure, rather than substance. Furthermore, at this
writing numerous possibilities remain whereby NAFTA may yet be derailed from
the fast track, again illustrating the unusual permeability of the trade negotiation
process to congressional pressure.
17 3
2. Presidential Power over Imports
Notwithstanding Congress's substantial constitutional powers over import
trade, the President can still resort to a reservoir of discretionary power, both
constitutional and statutory, if he feels imports threaten national security. While
the executive has traditionally pushed for open markets, it has also employed two
means to protect domestic industries deemed crucial for national security, such as
steel and high-technology industries.
First, Presidents have invoked their ill-defined authority to make executive
agreements to enter into voluntary restraint agreements (VRA). These "nona-
greement agreements" place informal quotas on imports from trading allies,
such as Japan and the EC. 174 Because VRAs are informal and theoretically have
no domestic legal effect-they only bind foreign producers to limit their
imports-the President is not required to obtain authorizing or implementing
legislation from Congress. In 1969 and again in 1972, the United States reached
such agreements with Japanese and EC industry groups to restrain steel imports,
which had led to a steep drop in U.S. steel production. A 1981 agreement
between the U.S. and Japanese governments similarly restricted Japanese auto-
mobile imports, while another agreement has regulated semiconductor im-
ports. 175
171. Id. § 1103(c), 102 Stat. at 1131.
172. See Fast Track, supra note 166 (describing in detail the political struggle over fast track
extension).
173. See generally Fast Track, supra note 166 (enumerating twelve congressional pressure points
into the NAFTA negotiation process under the current regime and suggesting possible legislative
revisions to the fast-track mechanism).
174. See generally PUBLIC CONTROLS, supra note 134, at 195-252; KOH, supra note 1, at 40-45
(discussing "nonagreement agreements").
175. JOHN H. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 619-22 (2d ed. 1986).
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Although acting unilaterally, Presidents Johnson and Nixon did receive the
implicit agreement of Congress to VRAs. Indeed, Congress had pressured the
executive to limit steel imports because they threatened national security by
reducing U.S. industry's ability to produce steel. In 1967, members of Congress
argued that imports of foreign steel had so injured the U.S. balance of payments,
reduced employment, and captured market share "as to threaten the soundness
of the domestic iron and steel industry and therefore the national security." 1 76 In
the 1970 Trade Act, the House Ways and Means Committee again encouraged
the executive to expand the VRA, resulting in the 1972 agreement.
Because the courts generally have shied away from trade issues, they have
deferred to such use of executive agreements. In Consumers Union v. Kissinger
a consumer interest group challenged the 1972 steel VRA as an executive en-
croachment on Congress's power to regulate foreign commerce. 177 In upholding
the VRA, the D.C. Circuit noted that "widespread concern" had mounted
because of injury to the domestic steel industry, "which is deemed to be of great
importance to the nation's security as well as to the peacetime economy.
' 178
Since the VRA had no binding domestic legal effect, nor precluded the President
or Congress from taking further action, the Court held that the VRA fell within
the President's plenary power over executive agreements. 179 In dissent Judge
Leventhal argued that VRAs violated the separation of powers because they
encroached on Congress's plenary power over international commerce. 180 How-
ever, for practical purposes, Consumers Union has given the President free rein
to enter subsequent accords of this kind in a broad array of product areas. 1
81
A second tool available to the President to limit imports derives from his
delegated statutory powers. Section 232 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act grants
the President the authority to adjust imports of a good if it "is being imported
into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to
threaten to impair the national security." 1 82 Section 232 confers on the President
the broad power to block any imports that threaten "domestic production needed
for projected national defense requirements." 183 He can enact section 232 sanc-
tions on any number of grounds: that the imports will reduce industrial capacity,
employment, supplies of raw materials or services, skills or investment, or even
losses in government revenues.
176. S. 2537, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1967), reprinted in PUBLIC CoNTRoLS, supra note 161,
at DS-567.





181. See id. at 174; see also United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953),
aff'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955) (invalidating sole executive agreement regulating
import of Canadian seed potatoes because of conflict with Agricultural Act of 1948).
182. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b) (1989).
183. Id.
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Congress did try to place two checks on this seemingly limitless power to
control imports. First, it required that the Commerce Department investigate
an import's effect on the economy before releasing the delegated authority.
Second, the 1974 Trade Act added a legislative veto to section 232. Addition-
ally, Congress included legislative history focusing section 232 on shortages of
raw materials, principally oil. 184 While the first constraint has proved of little
force and the second was rendered invalid by Chadha, the legislative history
may have influenced the executive to use section 232 primarily for petroleum
imports.
Use of section 232 to control oil imports demonstrates how the executive has
expanded the definition of national security to include protection of the general
health of the economy. None of the statute's provisions sets out a definition of
national security. When President Eisenhower first invoked section 232's prede-
cessor185 to establish a system of quotas for oil products, he had concluded that
U.S. oil dependence was threatening national security. 186 In 1973 President
Nixon replaced the program's quotas with fees on importers. In 1975 President
Ford sharply accelerated the fee rates, and in 1980 President Carter imposed a
complex system of fees on oil and gasoline. By 1980, section 232 oil controls
had clearly shifted from pure national defense concerns to efforts to encourage
domestic energy conservation. President Carter's 1980 use of section 232 was
part of a broad energy-saving program designed to lower consumption of both
foreign and domestic oil. 187 President Reagan broke the focus on oil in 1986
when he threatened to use section 232 against imports of machine tools, which
are critical to the production of advanced weapons, but held off after reaching
VRAs with the major suppliers.' 88
Presidents have also used section 232 as a foreign affairs tool. In both 1979
and 1982 Presidents Carter and Reagan employed the provision to wage eco-
nomic warfare against radical Middle East regimes. In response to the Iranian
seizure of U.S. hostages, President Carter used section 232 to cut off all Iranian
oil imports and thereby deny Iran critical foreign revenue. 189 Three years later,
President Reagan invoked section 232 sanctions against Libyan oil, even though
Libyan oil accounted for only 3 percent of all oil imports. President Reagan
clearly linked the sanctions to Libyan support for terrorism, rather than to do-
mestic national security shortages. He proclaimed, "Libyan policy and action
supported by the revenues from the sale of oil imported into the United States are
inimical to U.S. national security."' 90
184. See CARTER, supra note 126, at 101-02.
185. Trade Agreements Act of 1955, ch. 169, § 7, 69 Stat. 162, 166 (1955) (containing almost
the exact language of section 232).
186. Proclamation No. 3279, 24 Fed. Reg. 12,781 (1959).
187. See CARTER, supra note 126, at 104-08.
188. 22 WKLY. COMP. PREs. Doc. 1654 (1986).
189. Proclamation No. 4702, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,581 (1979).
190. Proclamation No. 4907, 47 Fed. Reg. 10,507 (1982).
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While Congress and the courts generally have given the President a free hand
with section 232, they have resisted him when he has clearly pursued domestic,
rather than national security, goals. In 1975, eight state governors and other
parties challenged President Ford's import fees on oil, claiming that section 232
allowed only the imposition of quotas. In Federal Energy Administration v.
Algonquin SNG Inc., the Supreme Court upheld the use of the fees, affirming the
President's broad discretion to use whatever controls he chose. 191 The Court
avoided the question of what constituted a proper "national security" use of
section 232. While a D.C. district court also avoided this question in Indepen-
dent Gasoline Marketers Council, Inc. v. Duncan, it struck down President
Carter's use of section 232 to encourage energy conservation because his plan
placed fees on both foreign and domestic oil. 192 Also responding to President
Carter's conservation program, Congress passed legislation over his veto to
repeal the plan, which had raised gasoline prices.' 
93
Even though Congress has delegated broad import powers to the President, it
has not hesitated to assert itself if his import policy has gone too far. Congress's
action in the 1980 confrontation with President Carter highlighted its overall
power and greater interest in oil policy. Whereas emergency powers and exports
have largely fallen within the President's unchecked discretion, Congress has
succeeded in keeping substantial control over trade policy. Even when Congress
itself has not directly checked presidential authority, its statutory delegations
have often provided private parties with tools to check the President. In 1986, for
example, President Reagan ordered his trade negotiators to seek agreements
limiting the export of machine tools to the United States from Japan, Taiwan,
Switzerland, and West Germany, this time spurred by a section 232 complaint
filed by the domestic machine tool industry, although he did not take action under
that section. 194 Thus, trade statutes successfully have imposed both congres-
sional and interest-group constraints on executive discretion on trade decisions.
Meanwhile, the domestic impact of trade policy has often forced Presidents to
seek congressional support for their unilateral actions. As a result, import de-
cision making reflects the theme of balanced institutional participation, as envi-
sioned by Youngstown, far more than the vision of unchecked executive discre-
tion that characterizes other areas of this field.
E. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF AMERICAN LAW
Unlike the four areas previously reviewed, extraterritoriality has not received
a great deal of attention from the executive or legislative branches. Nonetheless,
191. Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548 (1976).
192. Independent Gas Marketers Council, Inc. v. Duncan, 492 F. Supp. 614 (D.D.C. 1980); see
also Texas American Asphalt Corp. v. Walker, 177 F. Supp. 315 (D. Tex. 1959) (President Eisen-
hower's decision that oil imports threatened national security not subject to judicial review).
193. See 126 CONG. REc. 13,524-93 (1980).
194. See CARTER, supra note 126, at 103.
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it remains an aspect of international economics with significant implications for
national security. Growing global interdependence has made the U.S. economy
vulnerable to the development of long-term imbalances or sudden dislocations in
the world market.1 95 While neither the President nor Congress has sought sub-
stantially to regulate foreign trade, the courts have kept the option open by
extending the jurisdiction of U.S. laws overseas.
Growing dependence on the world market has led U.S. policymakers to seek
primarily domestic solutions. National defense producers today rely on foreign
components to produce their high-tech weaponry, while the importance of oil
needs no emphasis after the Persian Gulf War. In response, the United States
Government has sought to improve domestic supplies of vital national security
goods by, for example, encouraging semiconductor manufacturers to pool their
efforts or by reducing domestic oil consumption. However, except for the pipe-
line case discussed earlier,' 9 6 neither the President nor Congress has sought to
address such dependence by regulating wholly foreign trade.
The courts have stepped into this vacuum to extend U.S. jurisdiction to include
overseas transactions. Questions about the extraterritorial reach of U.S. economic
regulation have arisen primarily in the antitrust and securities contexts. Initially, U.S.
courts were reluctant to apply the Sherman and Clayton Acts overseas, particularly
because the statutes made no mention of foreign transactions. The Sherman Act
briefly outlaws agreements "in restraint of trade" between competing firms (hori-
zontal agreements) or firms in a production and distribution chain (vertical). 197 The
Clayton Act prohibits mergers and acquisitions that would lessen competition or
create a monopoly. 198 Respecting comity among nations, the Supreme Court in
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. declined to construe this silence as
authorizing antitrust suits for actions beyond the water's edge.199
As the United States' world position strengthened after World War II, so did
its assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Courts discarded American Ba-
nana's water's edge test and turned instead to an "effects" test. In United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa) Judge Learned Hand held that the antitrust
laws could proscribe transactions occurring wholly overseas so long as the con-
duct had direct and substantial effects in the United States. 200
Recent court decisions have substantially embroidered Judge Hand's effects
test. In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America the Ninth Circuit set out a
multifactor balancing process for deciding when a court may exercise extrater-
ritorial antitrust jurisdiction. 20 ' That test, which has now been adopted by the
195. See JORDAN, supra note 90, at 306. See generally ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE,
POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION (1977).
196. See supra notes 152-58 and accompanying text.
197. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1990).
198. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15-27 (1990).
199. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
200. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (ALCOA), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
201. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
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Department of Justice Antitrust Division and section 403 of the Restatement
Third of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, instructs courts to
consider factors such as international comity, effects on U.S. consumers, na-
tionality, foreseeability, and significance of effects when extending jurisdiction
extraterritorially. 20 2 In a powerful opinion by Judge Malcolm Wilkey, however,
the D.C. Circuit has questioned such complex judicial balancing and has argued
that federal courts should exert concurrent jurisdiction whenever the transaction
has both a territorial link and substantial effects in the United States.2 °3
Federal securities laws have received similar extraterritorial application by the
federal courts. Two federal statutes provide the government and private litigants
with strong antifraud provisions to block foreign transactions. First, rule lOb-5,
promulgated pursuant to section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Act, prohibits fraud
or failure to disclose a material fact "in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.''204 Second, the Williams Act proscribes fraud in connection with
tender offers.2 °5 Courts have construed both statutes to permit criminal prose-
cution by the Justice Department and civil suits by the SEC or private parties.
As mergers and acquisitions have grown international in scope, federal courts
have given securities laws a transnational reach. They have applied a test similar
to the one applied in the antitrust context: U.S. courts will take jurisdiction
whenever a "predominantly foreign transaction has substantial effects within the
United States." 20 6 The most striking aspect of these cases is how little is required
to satisfy the substantial, direct, and foreseeable effects test in the securities
context. In late 1988, for example, Minorco, a company controlled by South
African gold interests, attempted to take over Consolidated Gold Fields, another
foreign gold company. The Second Circuit found that U.S. securities laws could
be applied extraterritorially simply because U.S. investors held 2.5 percent of
Consolidated's stock.2O7
In so doing the federal courts again extended the possible overseas reach of
U.S. economic regulation. In the antitrust context they found that U.S. law could
202. Id. at 614; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS 22 (1988); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 403 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
203. See Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
The Supreme Court recently avoided a chance to settle the dispute by holding that in the case of
Japanese television exporters, even if there was jurisdiction, no antitrust violation had occurred. See
also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
204. 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1991), promulgated under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1990).
205. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1990)).
206. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1989); see also Schoen-
baum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), reh'g on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968)
(en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468
F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 202, § 402(1)(c).
207. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1989).
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regulate foreign agreements in restraint of trade that had domestic repercussions,
so long as they were substantial, direct, and foreseeable. In the securities context,
the courts have extended jurisdiction of U.S. laws over foreign transactions where
only a tiny fraction of the shareholders have been U.S. citizens. The assertion of
jurisdiction over wholly foreign trade thus represents a far-reaching extension of
U.S. regulatory authority in international economic affairs. This power could
prove valuable for national security purposes should Congress or the President
ever decide to enforce national security decisions upon wholly foreign trade.
In contrast to other regulatory areas, the courts have led this expansion, while
the President and Congress have largely followed in the wake of judicial action.
Congress has left securities, antitrust, and other important laws silent on extra-
territorial application, leaving to the executive branch the decision whether to
enforce the law extraterritorially, and to the courts whether to sustain the executive
action. 20 8 Except for President Carter's brief 1980 effort to freeze foreign Eu-
rodollar accounts during the Iranian hostage crisis and President Reagan's attempt
to prevent construction of the Soviet-Western Europe pipeline, the executive
branch has steered clear of aggressive extraterritorial economic regulation and has
argued against it before the Supreme Court.209 However, the courts have estab-
lished the jurisdictional litmus test that now allows U.S. law to apply extrater-
ritorially even to wholly foreign trade. If exercised, such jurisdiction would pro-
vide the political branches with ample regulatory precedents should they ever seek
to regulate foreign trade aggressively for national security purposes.
IV. The Next Step: Toward a Public Interest Theory
of Economics and National Security Statutes?
The foregoing discussion has demonstrated that the different areas involving
economics and national security have generated very different types of legal
regimes. The degrees of executive freedom or congressional oversight implicated
in each regime have resulted from the confluence of many different factors,
among them, the constitutional division of powers, each branch's historical role,
the need for swiftness and secrecy in U.S. action, and the demand of domestic
constituencies.
In the realm of domestic economic regulation Congress has granted the Pres-
ident broad powers in times of emergency to mobilize the economy. As embod-
ied in the Defense Production Act, Congress has delegated much of its control
over the domestic economy in peacetime to the executive without placing sig-
208. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991) (title VII does not
apply to American corporations operating overseas).
209. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 111 S. Ct. 1008 (1991), the executive is currently arguing
against extraterritorial application of regulations issued under the Endangered Species Act after
having argued unsuccessfully for extraterritorial application of title VII last year in Aramco. See
supra note 208.
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nificant checks on the use of that power. However, in normal times the budget
process constrains longer-term decisions on defense expenditures and ensures a
substantial level of congressional intervention into national security policymak-
ing. In these situations national security and economic policy arise from an
ongoing process of consultation and negotiation between the branches.
A second area of national security and economic policy, emergency powers,
mirrors the DPA's broad delegation of power, but without meaningful constraints
on executive discretion. Although Congress has tried to check presidential emer-
gency power to control international economic relations through the IEEPA, the
executive has successfully sidestepped most statutory controls with the aid of the
courts. Much of the credit for executive freedom in using the IEEPA has resulted
not just from congressional acquiescence, but from broad judicial deference to
executive exercises of statutory powers.
Export controls also provide the executive branch with substantial authority to
determine export policy, as well as substantial restraints. Under the EAA the
President has the necessary discretion to stop almost any good or technology
from leaving the country for national security, foreign policy, or short supply
reasons. However, when President Reagan tried to extend U.S. export controls
overseas, he met significant resistance from allies, as did President Carter when
he sought to freeze foreign overseas assets. Hence, allied governments, rather
than Congress, have acted to place checks and counterweights on executive
authority in the export control field.
Import and trade law leave even less room for unchecked executive discretion.
The significance of trade regulation for domestic industries and jobs guarantees
that Congress will intervene deeply in trade policy making. Moreover, Con-
gress's constitutionally assigned plenary power over foreign commerce and the
Senate's traditional role in the international agreement-making process ensure
that Congress will always have a significant voice in trade policy. Nonetheless,
by use of executive agreements (and "nonagreement agreements") and the Pres-
ident's statutory powers under the Trade Expansion Act, the executive still has
managed to carve out a substantial role in import trade policy.
Finally, the extraterritorial application of U.S. law over foreign nationals has
the potential to be an area of growing significance for economics and national
security policy, but one surprisingly subject to both executive and congressional
neglect. As the global economy grows increasingly interdependent, expansive
federal regulation of antitrust, securities, and other areas will create precedents
for other potentially far-reaching extensions of U.S. power in international eco-
nomic affairs. The full potential of this power has not yet been realized, however,
since the courts, rather than the legislative or executive branches, have largely
paved the way in applying federal law extraterritorially to foreign trade by for-
eign nationals.
Our tour d'horizon of economics and national security law bears significant
lessons for both international law scholarship and national policy making. For the
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last few years, the prevailing legal analysis of U.S. domestic policy making has
focused on public choice theory, which posits that organized interest groups are
the driving force behind legislation. Such interest groups support members of
Congress in their single-minded pursuit of reelection and in exchange Congress
passes legislation bestowing benefits on interest groups at the expense of the
diffuse, unorganized body politic.
210
Economics and national security law suggests that the "public choice model"
of politics is far too simplistic and does little to explain the separation of powers.
Most blatantly, public choice scholarship simply does not account for the crucial
role of the executive in policy making. However, many of the legal regimes we
have examined put the President in the primary, if not dominant, role of both
setting and executing policy. Moreover, the executive branch wields significant
influence over legislation through its veto power. In economics and national
security affairs the President can use the veto to follow a broader national agenda
that either filters out or selectively filters in interest-group desires pursued by
Congress. While agencies can become "captured" by interest groups, the ex-
ecutive branch also provides mechanisms for internal consultation and debate
that may encourage accountability in policy making or become equally subject to
interest-group capture.
Our examination also shows that Congress itself operates at a far higher level
of public consciousness than public choice scholars would have us believe.
While individual congressmen may place reelection at the top of their agendas,
when it comes time for making economics and national security decisions, con-
gressional committees can reduce interest-group influence and cooperate with the
executive in setting broad national policy. In fact, it appears that in many eco-
nomics and national security areas Congress has attempted to establish an effec-
tive statutory scheme, such as the IEEPA or export law, that gives the executive
sufficient discretion while also providing for substantial consultation with and
reporting to Congress. Congress often tolerates the exercise of such broad ex-
ecutive power even when it causes economic loss to constituent interest groups.
Indeed, it has not been Congress but the President, sometimes in cooperation
with or with the dramatic support of the courts, who has evaded or upset these
balanced statutory schemes at the expense of the public interest.
At a more abstract level public choice theory also fails to account for the
striking evolution of separation of powers law that has occurred in the economics
and national security arena. Public choice theory generally views policy making
through a formal lens, focusing simply on the passage of legislation as the sole
means of governmental action. What our review of economics and national
210. For two illuminating recent books surveying the relationship between public choice theory
and public policy, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILLIP P. FRIcKEY, LAW AND PUBUC CHOICE: A Carr-
ICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE
REFORM OF THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE (1992).
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security law shows is that the passage of legislation is only part, and potentially
only a tiny part, of a much richer, more complex story. Legislation provides only
the framework for a subtle and dynamic network of ongoing power and trust
among various executive and independent agencies, the President, Congress,
committees, and members. Consultation, reporting, regulations, and executive
orders are more often the means of making economics and national security
policy than is formal legislation, which stands only as the tip of the iceberg.
Putting aside the scholarly implications of this examination, this discussion
also has significant lessons for national and global policy making. This analysis
of economics and national security law shows that in the future the executive
branch will be far less able to rely on unilateral action than it has in the past, both
at home and abroad. Domestically, longer-term problems demanding sustained
government action, such as in trade policy, will force the President to seek the
cooperation of Congress through innovative and evolving procedural devices,
such as the fast-track mechanism. Simultaneously, presidential action overseas
will require the assent and cooperation of U.S. allies as national and regional
power quotients equalize, the world economy grows more interdependent, and
international economic problems demand multilateral solutions. The Persian
Gulf War provides perhaps the most graphic example of how U.S. policy must
become more multilateral both at home and abroad. At home President Bush was
ultimately driven to seek the cooperation of Congress in sending forces overseas,
yet his failure to do the same on the DPA stripped him of commensurate statutory
powers to mobilize the domestic economy. Overseas, President Bush's applica-
tion of economic sanctions against Iraq and Iraqi-controlled Kuwait required the
full cooperation of U.S. allies and the United Nations to be successful. However,
in the future, such global cooperation may prove to be more elusive and fleeting.
This discussion thus closes not only with a criticism of current theoretical
scholarship, but also with policy recommendations for the future use of econom-
ics and national security power. In order to be truly effective overseas, as well
as to comply with the National Security Constitution's vision of balanced insti-
tutional participation at home, all three governmental branches must aggres-
sively pursue multilateral consultation and cooperation in setting policy. This
study has shown that a combination of executive initiative, congressional acqui-
escence, and judicial tolerance has led us to the current predicament. Persistent
institutional habits that favor unilateral presidential action, together with con-
gressional and judicial passivity, may fail to unite the U.S. electorate and U.S.
allies to grapple with pressing global problems. By aggressively pursuing imag-
inative multilateral procedures, both at home and abroad, the various arms of the
federal government will have far better odds of meeting the challenges posed by
a more democratic, more interdependent, but perhaps more unstable, post-Cold
War world.
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